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Summary 
The evaluative priming paradigm aims to uncover the processes underlying 
evaluations. For this purpose, this paradigm presents a sequence of two or more 
stimuli varying on the valence dimension to which participants must provide a 
response. The “standard” evaluative priming effect is a relative facilitation of the 
required responses in congruent trials compared to incongruent trials. The following 
thesis argues that this evaluative priming effect depends on prime-target similarity, 
with higher similarity between prime and target leading to larger priming effects. Part 
one of this thesis presents a meta-analysis of existing data, which tests evidence for 
the impact of similarity on evaluative priming effects. This reanalysis is based on the 
assumption that positive information is overall more similar to other positive 
information than negative information is to other negative information. Thus, this 
analysis compares effects of positive and negative prime-target pairs. The results 
confirm that (similar) positive prime-target pairs elicit stronger priming effects than 
(dissimilar) negative prime-target pairs. This analysis involves a broad sample of 
stimuli and designs which supports the generalizability of this finding. However, the 
results are also in line with alternative interpretations attributing the valence 
asymmetries to other effects caused by valence (e.g., general inhibition). The 
following four experiments manipulate similarity either by selecting prime-target pairs 
based on pre-ratings or by presenting identical and non-identical prime-target pairs. 
All four experiments show that similar prime-target pairs create larger priming effects 
than dissimilar prime-target pairs. These findings have implications for our 
understanding of the evaluative priming paradigm, the use of evaluative priming as a 
measure of attitudes, and the conceptualization of the evaluative system. These 
implications will be discussed. 
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Introduction and Theoretical Background 
Every day each one of us is surrounded by hundreds of things and dozens of 
people. In spite of the amount of encounters, it is usually easy to tell, whether we like 
or dislike each of these things or persons. Evaluations (good vs. bad) come to our 
mind fast and effortless and can have a direct effect on behavior. Positive 
evaluations are linked to approach, whereas negative evaluations are linked to 
avoidance (Lewin, 1939; Neumann, Förster, & Strack, 2003). We approach people 
we like and distance ourselves from people we fear. Therefore, understanding 
evaluative processes is a fundamental requirement for understanding and predicting 
behavior.  
One of the central questions regarding evaluations is whether they are made 
in an “automatic” fashion or “deliberately” (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 
1986). This involves the questions whether evaluations require an intention or a goal 
to occur or whether they form in the absence of a goal. Fazio et al. (1986) argued 
that some (i.e., repeatedly evaluated) attitude objects, including words, pictures, or 
objects develop the ability to activate their respective evaluation automatically, 
whereas other attitude objects show no automatic evaluation. To test this prediction 
the authors developed the so-called evaluative priming (EP) paradigm. This 
paradigm consists of a series of trials, each trial starts with the presentation of a first 
stimulus (prime), which is followed by a second stimulus (target). Target and prime 
are either positive or negative. Fazio et al. (1986) instructed participants to categorize 
targets as “good” or “bad”. They found that responses towards targets were faster, if 
they were preceded by a prime of the same valence compared to when preceded by 
a prime of the other valence. This was termed EP effect. Thus, prime information 
influenced target responses. Fazio et al. (1986) argued that this effect resulted from 
prime evaluations, which were activated unintentionally and then influenced the 
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classification of the subsequent target stimuli. However, it is unclear whether this 
influence is limited to certain conditions and if it is, to which conditions (Burghardt & 
Unkelbach, submitted). Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and Pratto (1992) argued that the 
effects of primes are unconditional in nature and not limited to specific stimuli or 
specific situations (i.e., tasks). Thus, any prime should influence any target. They 
argued that attitude objects activate their corresponding evaluations when merely 
encountering them. Further, researchers assumed that this activation spreads to 
other attitude objects of the same valence (Fazio et al., 1986; Hermans, De Houwer, 
& Eelen, 1994). This conceptualization implies that a single attitude object activates a 
plethora of other concepts. It follows that a large amount of evaluations is always 
active and is activating further evaluations. 
In contrast, I will argue in the present work that evaluations do not influence 
any other subsequent evaluation but only have an effect on evaluations of similar 
concepts. More precisely, this thesis presents evidence that the EP effect depends 
on prime-target similarity. The present thesis will thereby offer new insight into the 
structure of the cognitive system and evaluative processes.  
These insights are interesting in their own regard but in addition they are also 
relevant for application. The EP paradigm is widely used as unobtrusive measure of 
attitudes (Wittenbrink, 2007). Researchers infer attitudes towards an attitude object 
(taking the place of the prime) from responses towards the target. If similarity 
influences EP effects than design construction should consider similarity between 
prime and target, which is not the case at the moment (Wentura & Degner, 2010b; 
Wittenbrink, 2007). Hence, evidence for the impact of similarity on EP effects could 
be the basis for improving implicit attitude measures.  
The relevance of similarity for processing is not a new assumption instead 
there are many examples of how the cognitive system uses similarity to guide 
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processing (Markman & Gentner, 2005). For instance new problems are solved 
based on known similar problems (e.g., Reed, Ernst, & Banerji, 1974). New 
exemplars, objects as well as humans, are classified as belonging to a category 
based on similarity to a prototype, or a previously encountered exemplar (Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986; Rosch, 1975). In stimulus identification similar 
distractors interfere more than dissimilar distractors (Nosofsky, 1985). Thus, there is 
ample evidence that similarity influences processing. In contrast to this, many 
researchers assume that EP effects are not influenced by relations between primes 
and targets (e.g., similarity; Hermans et al., 1994). Yet, as this assumption was never 
explicitly tested the present thesis aims to bridge this gap.  
To argue about the influence of similarity on EP effects I will first define 
similarity and compare different types of similarity. Subsequently, I will elaborate on 
the mechanisms that explain EP effects and how similarity could be implemented 
within these mechanisms. Following this, I will present empirical evidence regarding 
the relevance of similarity for EP effects. This evidence incorporates data from two 
sources: The first part is a meta-analysis of existing EP data; the second part 
presents new experimental data. The meta-analysis aims to show stronger EP 
effects for positive in contrast to negative prime-target pairs. As positive information 
is on average more similar to other positive information relative to negative 
information (Unkelbach, 2012; Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmueller, & Danner, 
2008), stronger EP effects for positive prime-target pairs provide evidence for the 
impact of similarity on EP effects. The meta-analysis allows testing this prediction for 
a large sample of different stimuli and thereby allows broad generalization. However, 
such a valence asymmetry in evaluative priming could be mediated by differential 
similarity, as I suggest, or it could be a general phenomenon of the differential 
processing of positive and negative information (e.g., general suppression of 
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negative information). To disentangle the effects of valence and similarity I conducted 
four experiments, which manipulated similarity orthogonally to valence. In the first 
experiment, I selected primes and targets to create similar prime-target pairs (e.g., 
war and gun) and dissimilar prime-target pairs (e.g., taxes and gun) for positive and 
negative stimuli respectively. I predict stronger EP effects for similar in contrast to 
dissimilar prime-target pairs irrespective of valence. A potential critique to this 
experiment is that a single stimulus is either similar or dissimilar and that similarity is 
solely varied between valences. To overcome this critique the last 3 experiments 
vary similarity within the same valence. Thus, the designs include relatively dissimilar 
positive and negative as well as highly similar positive and negative stimuli in the 
same experiment. Again, I predict especially pronounced EP effects for similar prime-
target pairs. Based on the results from the meta-analysis and my own empirical 
findings, I will discuss implications for cognitive models, for the application of EP as 
an attitude measure, and for evaluation in general. 
 
Similarity 
Before I turn to elaborate on effects of similarity in EP I will discuss different 
types of similarity and argue about the conceptualization of similarity used in this 
report. Similarity describes the relation between two concepts. This relation is not 
invariant but is context-dependent (Nosofsky, 1985). The perceived similarity of two 
objects for instance, depends on the entities that it is compared with. For example, a 
tiger and an eagle are perceived dissimilar when they are compared in the context of 
other animals (e.g., lion, robin, and seagull). However, when they are compared in 
the context of non-living concepts (e.g., chair, bottle, and skyscraper) they are 
perceived as more similar.  
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Three accounts of similarity were proposed: The Spatial view of similarity, the 
featural approach, and the structural alignment view (Markman & Gentner, 2005). 
These accounts differ both in the ways concepts are represented in memory as well 
as in the ways these representations are compared in order to form a similarity 
judgment. The spatial view of similarity represents concepts as points or vectors in a 
semantic space. Similarity corresponds to the distance between points or vectors. 
The lower the distance between two concepts the higher is the perceived similarity. 
This approach is often empirically implemented by multidimensional scaling where 
participants rate for instance, the similarity of a given pair of concepts (e.g., cat and 
dog) without specifying the features (e.g., four-legged) or dimensions (e.g., size) on 
which these concepts should be compared. Based on different mathematical 
algorithms the similarity ratings are used to estimate the spatial configuration of 
representations. Thus, it is not necessary to know whether the impression that cat 
and dog are similar is based on their similar size, shape, color or other features. This 
makes this view of similarity easy to estimate. 
In contrast, the featural approach assumes that similarity is inferred from the 
overlap of commonalities and differences. Concepts are represented by sets of 
features (e.g., cat is purring, four-legged, etc.). Similarity judgments (e.g., for cat and 
dog) are inferred by assessing the amount of commonalities (e.g., are pets, can be 
stroked) and differences (e.g., purrs vs. barks) between the two concepts (Tversky, 
1977). Perceived similarity increases with the number of commonalities and 
decreases with the number of differences. To measure similarity, relevant features of 
two concepts must be known.  
The structural alignment view also defines concepts by features but instead of 
comparing features only, similarity ratings are also influenced by hierarchical 
structure and alignment of features (i.e., relations between features). Features are in 
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contrast to both spatial view and featural approach not assumed to be independent. 
For instance, the fact that cats and dogs have offspring can be seen as a 
commonality, however, the fact that cats have kitten and dogs have puppies can be 
defined as differences (Markman & Gentner, 2005).  
The structure alignment view provides a good model to assess perceived 
similarity (Markman & Gentner, 1993; Markman & Gentner, 2005). However, it is 
computationally much more intensive than spatial models: Each relation needs to be 
checked for correspondence to ensure that all arguments of those relations match. 
The spatial view of similarity does not require knowledge about the specific 
commonalities and differences that form the basis of the similarity judgment. Thus, it 
is not necessary to define whether similarity of concepts is created by for instance 
semantic or perceptual overlap. Therefore, I will base the following work on a spatial 
measurement model of similarity. Especially, I will work with an operationalization of 
similarity used by Unkelbach et al. (2008) who measured similarity using 
multidimensional scaling. They estimated similarity of concepts by averaging over all 
dimensions of the conceptual representation generated by multidimensional scaling. 
For each concept they calculated the mean Euclidean distance to all other concepts 
across all dimensions of the specific multidimensional model to form an index termed 
density index. High density is equivalent to high similarity of concepts, thus concepts 
are close to each other in “space”. In contrast, low density is equivalent to low 
similarity. 
After defining the concept of similarity, I will now turn to the concept of 
associations. Like similarity, associations describe relations between concepts. The 
distinction between the two concepts is outlined in the following. 
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Associative Strength 
Associations form when two concepts repeatedly co-occur (e.g., chair and 
table; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, 1995). The 
strength of these associations is measured by the percentage of people, who report a 
concept in response to another concept in free association norms (e.g., Moss et al., 
1995). Theoretically, associative strength clearly differs from the similarity concept. 
Associations do not imply similar features. However, similarity if often empirically 
confounded with associative strength (Hutchison, 2003). Concepts with strong 
associations for instance chair and table are often also similar (e.g., furniture, four 
legged). Because of this confound it is useful to look at studies testing for effects of 
associations in EP to derive predictions for effects of similarity in EP. However, the 
concepts are theoretically distinct. 
 
Evaluative Priming 
The evaluative priming paradigm was developed to study the structure of the 
cognitive system (Fazio et al., 1986). As noted above, results from EP were used to 
argue about the nature of evaluation. For instance, whether attitude objects must be 
conscious to influence processing, whether evaluation is intentional, or whether it can 
be controlled (Spruyt, Gast, & Moors, 2011). In the course of this research different 
variations of the EP paradigm were developed. These variations are captured in the 
working definition of EP provided by Burghardt and Unkelbach (submitted): 
In its broadest sense, EP is a sequence of two or more stimuli varying on the 
valence dimension to which participants must provide a response. More 
concretely, a positive or negative stimulus is presented (i.e., the prime) which 
is followed by another positive or negative stimulus (i.e., the target). 
Participants respond to the target, usually with an evaluative classification 
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(e.g., “positive” vs. “negative”). The 2 (prime valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 
(target valence: positive vs. negative) structure of an EP trial creates 
congruent and incongruent trials. Either prime and target have the same 
valence (congruent trials) or prime and target differ in valence (incongruent 
trials). The “standard” EP effect is a relative facilitation of the required 
responses in congruent trials compared to incongruent trials. Responses 
become relatively faster and/or more accurate. (p. 6) 
This will be the working definition of the EP effect in the following thesis. Note that 
facilitation in congruent trials is relative in nature. This implies that EP effects can be 
based on response inhibition in incongruent trials as well as facilitation of responses 
in congruent trials. The question whether EP is better understood as facilitation or 
inhibition can only be assessed relative to responses to unprimed target baselines. 
Finding a suitable baselines proved to be impractical (see Wentura, 1999, for 
details). Thus, faster or more accurate responses can only be interpreted as relative 
differences between congruent and incongruent trials (Burghardt & Unkelbach, 
submitted). 
Though the relevance of similarity for attention and memory retrieval is well 
established (see above) EP effects were argued to be unaffected by similarity (e.g., 
Hermans et al., 1994; Wentura, 1999). Yet, this assumption was never tested. In 
contrast, I argue that the similarity between prime and target influences responses in 
the EP paradigm. More precisely, I argue that prime-target pairs are categorized 
faster when they are similar. For this argumentation I will first discuss existing 
evidence regarding the effect of similarity in EP. Subsequently, I will outline 
theoretical explanations of EP and their predictions regarding similarity. In the 
remainder, I will provide data from a meta-analysis and 4 experiments that support 
the impact of similarity on EP effects. 
9 
 
Existing Evidence about Similarity in Evaluative Priming 
It was repeatedly argued that EP effects occur for any stimulus of the same 
valence (Hermans et al., 1994; Wentura, 1999). Thus, similarity of prime and target 
should be irrelevant for EP effects. No study exists that systematically tested the 
impact of similarity on EP effects. However, some studies imply evidence regarding 
similarity. The most important study is a reanalysis of existing data (Unkelbach et al. 
(2008). Unkelbach et al. (2008) did not systematically vary similarity. Instead, they 
argued about differences in processing between positive and negative information. 
They assumed that similarity and valence are often confounded, with positive 
information being overall more similar to other positive information relative to 
negative information (see also; Unkelbach, 2012). If positive information is more 
similar than negative information and higher similarity between prime and target 
enhances EP effects than EP effects should be stronger for positive prime-target 
pairs in contrast to negative prime-target pairs. To test this, the authors conducted a 
reanalysis of seven articles and confirmed this assumption as EP effects were 
stronger for positive primes-target pairs compared to negative prime-target pairs. 
However, this evidence was based on the assumption that positive information is 
more similar to other positive information compared to negative information and 
therefore did not directly test the influence of similarity. Further, the analysis was 
based on a small sample of studies and could suffer from a biased sample. 
Hermans, Smeesters, De Houwer, and Eelen (2002) showed that EP effects 
were not based on associations. As similarity and associations are confounded, this 
study can thus be seen as evidence that similarity is not relevant for EP effects. In 
favor of the relevance of similarity for EP effects are studies by Wentura and Degner 
(2010a), who showed that trait words were only creating EP effects if both prime and 
target were either other-relevant traits (e.g., “brutal” or “just”) or possessor-relevant 
10 
 
traits (e.g., “intelligent” or “dull”), but not when prime-target pairs mixed both trait 
types. Rohr, Degner, and Wentura (2012) found that EP effects were sensitive to 
specific emotions and not merely to a positive-negative distinction. Both findings 
support the notion of specific EP effects as EP effects did not occur for any stimulus 
combination. Another interesting finding in this regard, is that EP effects were 
repeatedly absent for extreme stimuli (Glaser & Banaji, 1999). Assuming that 
extreme stimuli are generally very distinct from most stimuli they are often dissimilar 
from other concepts of that same valence. These findings are in line with the 
assumption that EP effects are based on similarity. In conclusion, evidence regarding 
the relevance of similarity is sparse and inconclusive. To understand why and how 
similarity could affect EP effects I will now outline processes underlying EP effects. 
 
Explanations of Evaluative Priming 
The following section outlines two broad theories that are most prominent in 
the EP research field, namely spreading activation and response competition. Further 
I discuss three minor accounts to explain EP effects because of their potential 
relevance for the effect of similarity on EP. Each section discusses an account and 
what assumption it makes about the effect of similarity on EP effects. 
 
Spreading activation. The earliest explanation of EP is based on spreading 
activation (Fazio et al., 1986). There are many different conceptualizations of 
spreading activation accounts, the major three accounts are outlined below. Albeit 
the difference between these accounts the basis of spreading activation is always the 
same: Humans represent all concepts they know in memory. The models differ 
regarding the organization of these memory models. The first models termed 
symbolic networks represent each concept by a single node (e.g., there is a node for 
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the concept kitten; Bower, 1981; Collins & Loftus, 1975). The different nodes are 
interconnected (e.g., kitten is connected to furry, purr and cat). The connections 
between nodes vary in strength or weight depending on associations or semantic 
relations between concepts (Collins & Loftus, 1975). For instance, kitten has a strong 
connection to the concept dog, whereas the connection between kitten and Hawaii is 
weak. 
The second models termed parallel distributed models represent concepts by 
patterns of activation across a collection of processing units (Masson, 1995; 
McClelland, Rumelhart, & the PDP research group, 1986). Concepts are identical to 
specific combinations of different features (e.g., kitten is purring, four-legged, etc.; 
Hutchison, 2003). In both cases encountering an instance of a concept (e.g., a word 
or a picture of a kitten) activates its representation in memory. This activation then 
leads to the activation of other concepts. In symbolic networks the activation spreads 
from one concept node (e.g., the concept kitten) to other related nodes (e.g., to the 
concepts dog or cat). Thereby, other concepts (e.g., dog) are co-activated with the 
original concept (e.g., kitten). In parallel distributed networks related concepts have 
overlapping patterns of activation. Thus, the concepts dog and kitten share a similar 
pattern (e.g., pet, four-legged, etc.), whereas the patterns of kitten and Hawaii differ a 
lot (e.g., pet vs. island). In sum, the activation of one concept leads to the (partial) 
activation of connected concepts either by strong links or similar patterns. If 
subsequently one of these activated concepts appears as target it is identified or 
processed faster than without pre-activation. That is how responses towards a target 
are facilitated when a connected or similar prime was presented.  
Hence, the two networks models both represent similarity. Similar concepts 
have stronger connections or more strongly overlapping patterns (Collins & Loftus, 
1975; Hutchison, 2003). It is plausible to assume that when prime and target are 
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more similar the target is activated more strongly. However, many researchers 
assume that EP effects should occur for all concepts of the same valence (Hermans 
et al., 1994). To allow for this prediction they argued that all concepts of a specific 
valence are connected by a valence node (e.g., Bower, 1981). They assumed that a 
concept activates the evaluation associated with it (Fazio et al., 1986; Hermans et al., 
1994). The activation than spreads to all concepts of the same valence (Hermans et 
al., 1994; Wentura, 1999). This conceptualization does not imply effects of similarity; 
instead all concepts of the same valence will be activated irrespective of their feature 
overlap or specific connections. A given prime (e.g., kitten) will thus activate the 
concept positive which will in turn activate similar concepts such as baby as well as 
dissimilar concepts such as Hawaii. As a result all positive concepts will be activated, 
which will then enable response facilitation. However, if the EP effect does depend 
on similarity another conceptualization is possible. Instead of assuming that all 
concepts of the same valence are activated it is also possible to assume that only 
similar concepts are activated. Thus, activation arises only when concepts are 
strongly connected or have strongly overlapping patterns. No pre-activation and no 
response facilitation will occur for dissimilar concepts even when they have the same 
valence. 
Both the symbolic network and the distributed network model described above 
locate the EP effect at the level of specific targets. The target concept (e.g., baby) 
itself is activated. However, a third conceptualization of spreading activation was 
proposed which assumes that not target concepts but only valence categories are 
pre-activated (Fazio, 2001). Instead of spreading to all concepts of the same valence 
activation spreads solely to the valence concepts (i.e., positive or negative). This 
facilitates positive or negative responses as the valence concept is pre-activated. 
Thus, a given prime such as kitten activates the concept positive and no other 
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concept. This implies that similarity of primes and targets is irrelevant. Primes will 
always activate its respective valence category as long as the prime is not 
ambiguous. This model was proposed in response to the inability to find EP effects in 
other than the evaluative decision task (Klauer & Musch, 2002; Klinger, Burton, & 
Pitts, 2000; Rothermund & Wentura, 1998). This was a surprising finding, as it was 
argued that if a specific target is pre-activated all responses towards this target 
should be facilitated (e.g., De Houwer, Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002; 
Rothermund & Wentura, 1998). If a concept (e.g., kitten) is activated this should 
facilitate all responses towards this concept, for instance, pronouncing the word 
kitten, deciding whether kitten is a word or not, or categorizing it as an animal. 
Empirically, this prediction could not be confirmed. EP effects were often absent 
when other responses than the standard evaluative decision task (positive or 
negative) were required (De Houwer et al., 2002; Klauer & Musch, 2001, 2002). 
In conclusion, different models of spreading activation were proposed that can 
but do not have to imply effects of similarity. Symbolic and parallel distributed 
network models are well suited to incorporate effects of similarity. However, 
researchers did not consider them. 
 
Response competition. The most important alternative explanation to 
spreading activation is called response competition. This account was also proposed 
based on the finding that EP effects were repeatedly absent with other tasks than the 
evaluative decision task (Klauer & Musch, 2002; Klinger et al., 2000; Rothermund & 
Wentura, 1998). Accordingly, a specific aspect of the evaluative decision task creates 
EP effects without spreading activation being involved. The evaluative decision task 
confounds the valence dimension (i.e., the dimension of the EP effect) with the 
dimension on which the response towards the target is made. In congruent trials both 
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prime and target have the same valence and require the same response. In 
incongruent trials primes and targets differ in valence as well as in the required 
response. Thus, it is unclear what causes the EP effect: The identical responses or 
the identical valence. To explain the EP effect it is assumed that participants 
generalize the task towards the target (i.e., evaluation) to the prime (Burghardt & 
Unkelbach, submitted). When a prime (e.g., kitten) appears it activates a response 
(e.g., press key labeled positive), when the target is congruent (e.g., baby) the 
activated response can be enacted. In case of an incongruent target (e.g., war) the 
response to the prime must be inhibited because it is incorrect. Therefore, responses 
in incongruent trials are slower and more error-prone than responses in congruent 
trials. The EP effect is thus explained by different responses activated in incongruent 
trials, no target concept is activated. 
Response conflict can operate on two levels: On a motor response level or on 
a conceptual level. Motor response interferences stems from the movement of the 
response (e.g., key press) which either does (incongruent trials) or does not compete 
(congruent trials) with target response. Prime and target are processed 
independently up to response selection stage at which responses interact (Klauer, 
Musch, & Eder, 2005). On the conceptual level, response conflict already results at 
the stage of categorizing the target as either positive or negative. In congruent trials 
both prime and target either activate the concept positive or the concept negative. In 
contrast, in incongruent trials the prime activates for instance the concept positive but 
the target activates the concept negative.  
Irrespective of the concrete conceptualization of response competition the EP 
effect is caused by same or different responses. This implies that similarity between 
prime and target cannot be relevant for EP effects as only the link between concepts 
and responses matter. Finding effects of similarity in the EP paradigm would 
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therefore also challenge response competition accounts. Thus, tests of similarity 
provide a test of the major accounts to explain EP effects. In addition to these major 
accounts three other accounts were proposed to explain EP effects, which are 
outlined below. 
 
Evaluation window account. The evaluation window or psychophysical 
account again assumes that EP effects originate from processes at the conceptual 
level of valence categories (Klauer, Teige-Mocigemba, & Spruyt, 2009). The account 
is an overarching model for judgment processes in categorization tasks with a small 
number of answer categories and with speeded responses that limit the possibility for 
complete information processing. Though it is based on response competition, it also 
applies to spreading activation at the level of valence categories, labelled “valence 
counter” by the authors. The model assumes that a valence counter is continuously 
keeping track on evaluative input from the environment. When a positive or negative 
response is required, evidence is accumulated until a threshold is reached in favor of 
either a positive or a negative response. The prime’s influence on target responses 
depends on EP timing, prime extremity and context. Prime information is discounted 
if it is too distant or too extreme to be relevant for target judgments. Thus, there are 
cases when prime information is not used as evidence in the evaluative decision 
about the target. However, an effect of similarity was not incorporated in the account. 
The impact of a specific prime depends on the ease by which it is categorized as 
positive or negative. As long as a prime activates unambiguous categorizations as 
positive and negative its influence does not depend on prime-target similarity. Finding 
similarity effects on EP effects would therefore also challenge the evaluation window 
account. 
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Compound cue models. Ratcliff and McKoon (1988) presented a retrieval 
account of semantic priming in memory. This account assumes that prime and target 
are processed in unity by forming a compound cue. This compound cue is tested 
against memory. If a compound is familiar, it cues strong responses from memory. 
Ratcliff and McKoon (1988) assumed that a compound is familiar when prime and 
target are associated; directly (e.g., table and chair) or indirectly (e.g., lion and stripes 
via tiger; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). Fockenberg, Koole, and Semin (2008) introduced 
a compound cue model to the EP paradigm. They argued that primes and targets are 
combined into a compound (they term it snapshot) because of their temporal 
proximity. If compounds do not yield enough congruent information for the required 
response (e.g., evaluative decision) they will be split into distinct prime and target 
information which is then be analyzed separately. Prime information can be 
discarded, for instance, if it is extreme or temporally distant. Ratcliff and McKoon 
(1988) argued that associated prime-target pairs form strong compound cues. 
However, associations and similarity are often confounded (Hutchison, 2003) thus it 
is also possible to argue that similar prime-target pairs will form strong compound 
cues, which will activate strong responses from memory and thus facilitate 
responses. If prime and target form a coherent compound cue they will enable fast 
and accurate responses. Thus, this account can imply faster responses for similar 
prime-target pairs. 
 
Affective matching hypothesis. The affective matching hypothesis assumes 
that prime and target undergo a spontaneous check for affective consistency (Klauer 
& Stern, 1992). In case of affective consistency, an affirmative response is triggered. 
This response than facilitates congruent responses. For example, when the prime-
target pair presented is kitten and baby this creates a feeling of consistency and 
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facilitates a “yes”, “correct” or “positive” response. Predictions of the affective 
matching hypothesis are limited to response tasks that have affirmative nature, 
especially the evaluative decision task, where participants decide whether a target is 
positive or negative. The affective matching hypothesis does not make assumptions 
about similarity. However, it could be argued that similar prime-target pairs also lead 
to a feeling of consistency and therefore facilitate affirmative responses. As a 
consequence similar prime-target pairs would facilitate “positive” or “good” responses 
but inhibit “negative” or “bad” responses. Thus, affective matching can predict 
similarity effects but would imply an asymmetric effect depending on valence. 
 
Summary. There are three accounts that can incorporate effects of similarity 
on EP effects: spreading activation, compound cue and affective matching accounts. 
In contrast, response competition, the major alternative to spreading activation, 
cannot explain effects of similarity. The same is true for the evaluation window 
account. Thus, the question whether similarity influences EP effects enables theory 
testing. Despite this important contribution, effects of similarity were never 
systematically tested in the domain of EP effects. 
The present thesis strives to bridge this gap. To do so my thesis will follow two 
lines on research. In the first section I will follow up on the research by Unkelbach et 
al. (2008) who reanalyzed existing EP studies for valence asymmetries, based on 
their notion that positive and negative information differs in similarity. The first part of 
my thesis will test whether their basic finding replicates with a broader set of studies. 
Thus, I will test whether EP effects are stronger for positive (i.e., similar) prime-target 
pairs in contrast to negative (i.e., dissimilar) prime-target pairs relative to their 
respective incongruent prime-target pairs. In the second section I will present data 
from 4 experiments that provide primary evidence for similarity effects on EP effects. 
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Meta-Analysis of Evaluative Priming 
As previous research on EP did not systematically manipulate similarity, the 
meta-analysis cannot directly test the impact of similarity. Instead, evidence is based 
on the assumption that positive information is on average more similar to other 
positive information relative to negative information (Unkelbach, 2012; Unkelbach et 
al., 2008). This could be based on a higher need to differentiate between different 
negative stimuli than to differentiate between positive stimuli. Different negative 
stimuli require specific responses (e.g., fight an attacker or spit out spoiled food) and 
ignoring these differences has high costs for the organism (Peeters & Czapinski, 
1990; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Irrespective of the cause for this difference in 
similarity, the implications are clear cut. If positive information is more similar to other 
positive information and negative information is more diverse and higher similarity 
between prime and target enhances EP effects, than EP effects should be stronger 
for positive prime-target pairs in contrast to negative prime-target pairs. Unkelbach et 
al. (2008) confirmed this assumption in a reanalysis of seven articles. EP effects 
were stronger for targets following positive primes compared to targets following 
negative primes. The major shortcoming of this finding is that it is based on a small 
sample of studies that are not representative of EP research. Further, they might not 
include a big variety of stimuli and therefore results might not generalize to other 
stimuli. The first step of this thesis will therefore be to replicate the finding of stronger 
EP effects for positive congruent trials compared to negative congruent trials by 
Unkelbach et al. (2008) with the full sample of EP studies in a meta-analysis. Thus, I 
will test for valence asymmetries in EP effects. 
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Method 
The data presented in this section is a subsample of a dataset collected for a 
general meta-analysis of EP effects (Burghardt & Unkelbach, submitted). This 
general meta-analysis included 93 articles with 434 effect sizes. For this thesis the 
sample is reduced to include only experiments providing data on valence 
asymmetries in EP. Thus, the sample is reduced to experiments that report EP 
effects separately per valence. More precisely, the selection process was identical 
except for criteria 8a and 8b (see below). 
 
Selection of studies. To find all studies using the EP paradigm I retrieved all 
articles from the PsychInfo database citing the original work by Fazio et al. (1986) 
and all articles using the terms “affective priming” or “evaluative priming“ in their 
abstracts published until March 2010. To identify the relevant studies I defined the 
evaluative priming paradigm as an approach that consists of the presentation of two 
or more discrete stimuli in a short temporal order. The paradigm requires participants 
to respond to one stimulus by categorizing, recognizing, pronouncing, by naming it. 
 
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria. I excluded experiments based on 
theoretical assumptions and practical requirements. The central inclusion criterion 
was that an experiment had to adopt an EP paradigm but not used as a measure of 
prime valence (see below). I excluded studies based on the following criteria. 
1. Only peer-reviewed journal articles. 
I excluded all books and book chapters, mainly due to the fact that many chapters 
present studies also reported in published journal articles.  
2. The articles contain data about a sequential priming paradigm with two 
or more discrete stimuli in a short temporal order. 
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This excludes all reviews, theoretical contributions as well as any study design that 
did not use primes (e.g., questionnaires or the implicit association test (IAT)). 
3. Languages: English and German. 
I excluded articles in languages in which I am not proficient (e.g., Chinese). 
4. Prime and target vary on the valence dimension; both positive and 
negative stimuli must be included. 
This excludes studies with similar paradigms, especially semantic, conceptual, or 
repetition priming. Further, I excluded studies that only presented neutral and 
positive, or neutral and negative stimuli (Hinojosa, Carretié, Méndez-Bértolo, Míguez, 
& Pozo, 2009; Hock & Egloff, 1998; Miles & Johnston, 2007; Ode & Robinson, 2009; 
Ortigue, Bianchi-Demicheli, de C. Hamilton, & Grafton, 2007), because they do not 
represent the full range of the valence dimension. This criterion also excludes studies 
applying the affect misattribution paradigm (Payne, Cheng, Govorum, & Stewart, 
2005), because only neutral targets are presented. 
5. Prime and target valence are known by pretest or individual selection 
by participant. 
This excluded studies that use EP as measure of prime valence; in these cases, 
prime valence was inferred from responses towards targets and was not 
predetermined. Such studies are not informative, because the absence of EP effects 
might reflect the correct measurement of a non-existing attitude. This criterion further 
led to the exclusion of studies where prime valence is based on additional 
assumptions about effects of certain manipulations, for example, valence transfer by 
evaluative conditioning (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 
1998; Hermans, Spruyt, & Eelen, 2003; Hermans, Vansteenwegen, Crombez, 
Baeyens, & Eelen, 2002; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004), goal 
relevance of primes (Moors & De Houwer, 2001; Moors, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004; 
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Moors, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2005), approach and avoidance behavior 
(Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004), mood (Clark, Teasdale, Broadbent, & Martin, 1983; Erber, 
1991; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1996), or feedback (Rothermund, 2003). This 
was done to ensure that EP null effects are not due to the incorrectness of these 
additional assumptions (e.g., unsuccessful evaluative conditioning). 
6. Prime and target must be separable stimuli.  
The criterion of separation of prime and target led to the exclusion of studies that 
embedded the target in the prime, namely studies that used videos as primes and 
integrated the targets as pictures popping up in these videos (Kivikangas & Ravaja, 
2009; Ravaja, Kallinen, Saari, & Keltikangas-Jarvinen, 2004). I introduced this 
criterion because the prime-target integration does not provide the possibility to 
determine the temporal distance between prime and target. 
7. Only non-clinical samples.  
I excluded studies using clinical samples, as participants with clinical disorders might 
differ in regard to their evaluations and response latencies from non-clinical 
participants. However, I included studies that use non-clinical participants, but 
incorporate clinically relevant traits, for example, anxiety (Hermans, Spruyt, De 
Houwer, & Eelen, 2003), or alexithymia (Suslow, Arolt, & Junghanns, 1998). 
In the last stage I excluded studies that did not provide the necessary data for effect 
size estimates. To maximize the number of included effect sizes I conducted two 
separate analyses: One based on standardized effect sizes and one based on 
unstandardized effect sizes (for details, see below). These two analyses created the 
need for two different selection criteria (8a and 8b). 
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Figure 1. Flowchart of the total number of studies identified (top), excluded by criteria 
(middle), and accepted in the analyses (bottom). 
 
8a)  Estimation of standardized effect sizes are possible. 
Means and standard deviations or standard errors were available for all four prime 
valence target valence combinations (negative primes with negative targets (P-T-), 
negative primes with positive targets (P-T+), positive primes with negative targets 
(P+T-) and positive primes with positive target (P+T+)). Standard deviations were not 
estimated from graphs because of low accuracy. 
Studies found between 1986 – 2010 
PsychInfo (n = 923) 
         Studies excluded by Criteria 
 
1. No journal article (n = 226) 
2. No sequential priming paradigm (n = 371) 
3. Not published in English or German (n = 38) 
4. Primes and targets do not vary valence (n = 53) 
5. Prime or target valence is unknown or arguable (n = 119) 
6. Primes and targets are not separable (n = 2) 
7. Participants from clinical sample (n = 14) 
121 effect sizes from  
37 published articles 
included in meta-analysis 
a) Analysis of standardized effects 
8. Effect size estimates were not 
possible based on the data (n = 87) 
56 effect sizes from  
13 published articles included 
in meta-analysis 
b) Analysis of unstandardized effects  
8. Means were not available for all 
prime-target combinations (n = 63) 
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8b) Response latencies for all four prime valence target valence 
combinations were available (i.e., unstandardized effect size estimates 
are possible) 
In sum, these criteria led to the inclusion of a wide variety of EP studies. Figure 1 
details the study selection process. 
 
Coding. Coding of effects was done by 13 trained research assistants, 
Christian Unkelbach, and the author using a scoring manual. All effect sizes were 
double coded by the author. Inconsistencies between the author and coders were 
resolved through discussion. 
 
Data preparation. There are two different ways to estimate EP effects per 
valence. Effects can be estimated based on unstandardized or standardized 
measures (Bond, Wiitala, & Richard, 2003). To ensure that results do not depend on 
the estimation method I will report both a) standardized and b) unstandardized 
analyses. The standardized analysis is based on Cohen’s d as effect size measure 
(Borenstein, 2009; Cohen, 1988). The unstandardized analysis is in the raw metric of 
ms. In both cases I collected mean response latencies from the four different trial 
types: positive prime positive target (P+T+), positive prime negative target (P+T-), 
negative prime negative target (P-T-), and negative prime positive target trials (P-T+). 
To obtain as many effects as possible I included response latencies per condition per 
experiment. If data was not available per condition, the effect was calculated per 
experiment instead. Thus, some experiments are included with one effect size per 
experiment and others are included with more than one effect size per experiment. In 
cases where experiments report both response latencies and error rates only 
response latencies were included in the analyses. Regarding the analysis with 
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standardized effect sizes no experiment with error rates reported all information 
necessary for the estimation; thus leaving only response latency data. Further, I 
limited the analysis with unstandardized estimates to include only response latency 
data to keep all effects in the same metric. As a result all analyses are based on 
response latency data. 
 
Analysis of standardized effects. Mean effects were standardized using 
standard deviations for all prime valence-target valence pairs. Standard deviations 
were also calculated from standard errors. Yet, standard deviations were only 
available for the calculation of 56 effect sizes, which are thus the basis of the 
analysis of standardized means. Cohen's d was calculated based on standard 
deviations and means (Cohen, 1988) using Formula 1 for repeated measurement 
designs: 
 
d =
M1−M2
SDWithin
  (1) 
The mean standard deviations were calculated with the following formulas. 
SDDifference =  √(SD1
2 + SD2
2 − 2 ∗ r ∗  SD1 ∗ SD2) (2) 
SDWithin =
SDDifference
√2(1−r)
 (3) 
Note. SDDifference = standard deviation of the difference score in a within-subject design; 
SDWithin = standard deviation within groups; M1 = mean response latency of incongruent trials; 
M2 = mean response latency of congruent trials; r = correlation of dependent the measures 
(i.e., congruent and incongruent trials); d = Cohen’s d; n = number of participants; 
SD1 = standard deviation of congruent trials; SD2 = standard deviation of incongruent trials; 
adapted from Borenstein (2009, p. 229). 
 
Effect sizes were not estimated from t, F or p-values because they were never 
available for both prime valence and target valence effects. As can be seen in 
Formula 3 the calculation of the within-group standard deviation (SDwithin) requires an 
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estimate of the mean correlation between dependent measures, in this case the 
correlation between responses latencies in congruent and in incongruent trials. This 
correlation corrects the estimate of the population effect size for the effects of a 
dependent measurements design. The dependent measurements design limits the 
standard deviation relative to an independent design and leads to an underestimation 
of the deviation in the population. Thus, the correlation is necessary to obtain a valid 
effect size estimate from dependent measurements (Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, & 
Burke, 1996). However, no article reported correlations between congruent and 
incongruent trials. Therefore, I estimated this correlation. For this purpose, I 
contacted 9 authors of recent studies. Four authors sent data from a total of 31 
conditions based on responses latency data. The corresponding effect sizes originate 
from the first experiment from Fockenberg, Koole, and Semin (2006), Frings and 
Wentura (2008), and Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, Vandromme, and Eelen (2007) 
and from the third experiment from Klauer et al. (2009), which was the first 
experiment of this study with only one prime. Following Fisher Z-transformation, 
averaging and retransformation, the estimated mean correlation between mean 
response latencies in congruent and in incongruent trials was r = .93. This mean 
correlation entered the Formulas 2 and 3. 
In addition to providing an estimate of average effect sizes, this analysis also 
provides an estimate of publication bias. Publication bias is a potential threat to the 
validity of meta-analyses (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001). As non-significant results 
tend to be unpublished the data of published studies can be biased to include 
significant results more often than non-significant results. This leads to an 
overestimation of population effects. To estimate the impact of publication bias on the 
data I will report Kendall’s tau (Begg & Mazumdar, 1994). Kendall’s tau is the 
correlation between effect sizes and standard errors of the effect sizes. It provides an 
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estimate of the size and direction of publication bias. Samples with strong publication 
bias show high (significant) correlations, whereas samples without publication bias 
shows a (non-significant) correlation around zero, In the absence of a publication 
bias, effect sizes with high standard error (i.e., small samples) are randomly 
distributed around the population effect size, thereby creating a correlation of zero.  
The standardized analysis were based on a SPSS syntax for meta-analyses 
by Field and Gillett (2010) adjusted for repeated measurement (Borenstein, 2009). It 
provides an estimate of the average effect weighted by the inverse variance. 
 
Analysis of unstandardized effects. Calculations based on unstandardized 
effects stay in their original metric and require no data about standard deviations 
(Bond et al., 2003). Because means are being reported more often than means plus 
the corresponding standard deviations, the analysis of unstandardized effects was 
based on markedly more data. It yielded 121 effect sizes. I followed the analysis 
proposed by Unkelbach et al. (2008). My analysis was based on two formulas. 
Formula P1 tested for target valence effects; it compares mean responses for 
positive and negative targets. Formula P2 tested for prime valence effects; it 
compares the effect of positive and negative primes.  
 
[(P+T-) - (P+T+)] – [(P-T+) - (P-T-)] > 0  (P1) 
[(P-T+) - (P+T+)] – [(P+T-) - (P-T-)] > 0  (P2) 
Note. P+T- = positive primes negative targets; P+T+ = positive primes positive targets; P-T+ 
= negative primes positive targets; P-T- = negative primes negative targets; adapted from 
Unkelbach et al. (2008) 
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Description. The analyses of standardized and unstandardized effects were 
based on different samples. Relatively few data was available for the analysis of 
standardized effects (56 effect sizes), whereas the analysis for unstandardized 
effects provided about twice as much data (121 effect sizes). 
The analysis of standardized effects relied mainly on student samples (98%). 
Most participants were English speaking (36%), followed by German speaking (34%). 
The remaining data was from participants speaking French (14%), Dutch (7%), 
Spanish (2%), Finnish (4%), and Italian (4%). The most frequent response task was 
the evaluative decision task (63%). Other response tasks were the naming task 
(18%) and the lexical decision task (20%; where participants decide whether the 
target is a word or a non-word). 
The majority of effect sizes analyzed used word primes (68%) and word 
targets (93%). Other primes were faces (14%), pictures (11%), and sounds (7%). 
Targets also included faces (7%). Stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA), which is the 
time between prime onset and target onset ,varied between 71 and 1000 ms, with a 
mean SOA of 348 ms (SD = 343 ms). In contrast to the standard EP paradigm (see 
Burghardt & Unkelbach, submitted) most effects relied on data with more incongruent 
than congruent trials. This is captured by a congruency proportion (CP) smaller than 
.5 for 61% of the included effects and equal to .5 for 34% of the included effects. 
As more data was available for the analysis of unstandardized effects, the 
data includes a broader variation of EP designs. Nevertheless, mostly students 
participated (97%). Again, most participants spoke English (55%), followed by 
German (30%), Dutch (7%), French (3%), Finnish (2%), Italian (2%), Spanish (1%), 
and Polish (2%). Again, the evaluative decision task was the most frequent task 
(71%). The sample also included data from dual tasks (3%), which combine more 
than one type of response to the same target, and data from a recognition task (2%). 
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Further, naming task (15%) and lexical decision task (9%) were included. As in the 
analysis of standardized effects primes and targets were mostly words (81% and 
93%, respectively). Again, primes included faces (3%), pictures (8%), and sounds 
(3%). Further, primes included prosody (3%), odor (1%), and flavor (1%). Targets 
included pictures (2%), faces (5%), and prosody (1%). The high variability of stimuli 
in this analysis is especially important to ensure that results are not limited to a small 
set of stimuli (e.g., only words), but do generalize. SOA varied between -100 and 
10000 ms with a mean SOA of 457 ms (SD = 962). The most frequent SOA was 300 
ms. Again, CP was often smaller than .5 (in 55% of all cases) compared to an equal 
CP of .5 (only in 33% of all cases). 
 
Results 
Results are presented separately for standardized and unstandardized 
analyses. 
 
Analysis of standardized effects. In the following, I will report results from 
standardized analysis to estimate the impact of valence on the EP effect. Each 
estimate calculates the EP effect of a congruent prime-target pair relative to an 
incongruent prime-target pair. There are four possible combinations of these 
comparisons, which are all reported below. The EP effect of positive prime positive 
target pairs (P+T+) is compared to both positive prime negative target (P+T-) and 
negative prime positive target pairs (P-T+). The EP effect of negative prime negative 
target pairs (P-T-) is compared to both positive prime negative target (P+T-) and 
negative prime positive target pairs (P-T+). This, results in an estimate of EP effects 
per prime valence and per target valence (cf. Formula P1 and P2).  
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Evaluative priming effects for positive primes. Positive congruent prime-
target pairs (P+T+) were reliably faster than negative prime positive target (P-T+) 
pairs, the average EP effect was d = 0.15 (95% CI = [0.10, 0.19]), this was 
significantly different from zero (z = 6.89, p < .001). There was no evidence of 
publication bias (Kendall's tau = .07, p = .43). The difference between positive 
congruent prime-target pairs and positive prime negative target pairs (P+T-) was 
even more pronounced: Here, the average EP effect was d = 0.34 (95% CI = [0.26, 
0.42]); this effect was again significantly different from zero (z = 8.52, p < .001). 
There was no evidence for publication bias (Kendall's tau = .02, p = .84). 
 
Evaluative priming effects for negative primes. Negative congruent prime 
target pairs (P-T-) showed reliable EP effects, when compared to positive prime 
negative target pairs (P+T-): Here, the average EP effect was d = 0.11 (95% 
CI = [0.07, 0.15]). Again, this effect size was significantly different from zero 
(z = 4.92, p < .001). There was no evidence for publication bias (Kendall's tau = .08, 
p = .37). Negative congruent prime-target pairs showed a reversed EP effect relative 
to negative prime positive target (P-T+) trials (d = - 0.09, 95% CI = [-0.17, -0.02]). 
This effect was significantly smaller than zero (z = 2.35, p = .019). Thus, responses 
in incongruent trials were faster than responses in congruent trials. Again, there was 
no evidence for publication bias (Kendall's tau = -.06, p = .50).  
In summary, positive congruent prime-target pairs always showed EP effects. 
The EP effect was larger when comparing to incongruent trials with negative targets 
(P+T-). This is in line with a slowdown by negative targets. Negative congruent trials 
showed a reversed EP effect when compared to incongruent trials with positive 
targets (P-T+). However, negative congruent trials showed the standard EP effect 
when compared to incongruent trials with negative targets (P+T-). Thus, the 
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difference between congruent and incongruent prime-target pairs was bigger when 
compared to trial with negative targets (P+T-). In conclusion, this analysis showed 
clear evidence for valence asymmetries. Positive stimuli created reliable and larger 
EP effects than negative stimuli. Differences between positive and negative targets 
were more pronounced than differences between positive and negative primes. No 
analysis showed indications of publication bias.  
 
Analysis of unstandardized effects. The second analysis used 
unstandardized raw means. Figure 2 shows the average response latencies 
separately for each combination of prime valence and target valence. Visual 
inspection confirms that positive congruent prime-target pairs (P+T+) evoke the 
fastest responses. Responses in negative congruent prime-target pairs (P-T-) are 
faster than responses in incongruent pairs with positive primes (P+T-), but slower 
than responses in incongruent pairs with negative primes (P-T+). Thus, EP effects do 
not lead to the same facilitation for positive and negative congruent trials. Following 
the analysis by Unkelbach et al. (2008), I report two estimates for target and prime 
valence effects. Formula P1 (see above) calculates differences between responses 
towards positive and negative targets. Formula P2 (see above) calculates differences 
between responses following positive primes compared to responses following 
negative primes. In accordance with prior findings, P1 showed that responses on 
negative targets were on average 66.95 ms (SD = 70.74) slower than responses on 
positive targets. This difference deviated significantly from zero (t(120) = 10.41, 
p < .001). P2 showed that responses after positive primes were on average 9.61 ms 
(SD = 42.26) faster than responses following negative primes (t(120) = 2.50, 
p = .014). Thus, these unstandardized differences mirror both the findings of the 
standardized results as well as the findings by Unkelbach et al. (2008). EP effects 
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differ for negative and positive stimuli. Target valence has stronger impact than prime 
valence. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean response latencies to all four combinations of prime valence target valence 
pairs. 
Note. P = Prime; T = Target, + = Positive valence, - = Negative valence. Adapted from “A 
meta-analysis of sequential affective and evaluative priming: Effects, theories and 
applications” by J. Burghardt and C. Unkelbach, submitted. 
 
Discussion 
The two analyses show matching patterns of results. Thus, the type of 
analysis has no impact on results and conclusions. The results confirm the existence 
of valence asymmetries in EP effects. There is no evidence of publication bias, which 
supports the validity of the findings. The data is based on a broad sample of stimuli, 
which supports the notion that valence asymmetries are a general phenomenon. 
Moreover, the findings fit into the broader literature of valence asymmetries in 
categorization, description, and evaluation (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001). Further, the findings replicate the reanalysis by Unkelbach and 
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colleagues (2008). Both, the standardized and the unstandardized analysis show that 
the differences between congruent and incongruent trials (i.e., EP effect) are larger 
for positive congruent pairs than for negative congruent pairs. Thus, the overall EP 
effect is mainly driven by positive prime positive target pairs (P+T+); in contrast to 
negative prime negative target pairs (P-T-). The analysis of standardized effects 
suggests that EP effects can reverse for negative congruent trials. Both analyses 
show that target valence has stronger impact on results than prime valence. 
These results imply faster responses towards positive stimuli compared to 
negative stimuli. Thus, they contradict the view that negative stimuli enable faster 
responses (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Hansen & Hansen, 
1988; Taylor, 1991). The results are in line with two interpretations: Either responding 
to positive stimuli is facilitated or responding to negative stimuli is inhibited. However, 
as the comparison between congruent and incongruent trials is relative in nature and 
no baseline measure of “neutral” responses is available, it is not possible to 
determine whether positive information facilitates processing or negative information 
hinders responding. Thus, both interpretations are in line with the findings. The 
following paragraph outlines the processes that could underlie the valence 
asymmetries in evaluative priming. 
Given the wide variety of stimuli used, it seems highly unlikely that the results 
are caused by specific features of the stimuli considered in this meta-analysis. Thus, 
the differences should result from general processes. There are three different 
explanations in terms of processes that could explain the data. First, Unkelbach et al. 
(2008) argued for a fundamental valence asymmetry in the information environment 
that also moderates EP effects (Unkelbach, 2012). Unkelbach et al. (2008) 
postulated that positive information is on average more similar to other positive 
information, whereas negative information is more diverse. The differential density of 
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positive and negative information explains the observed asymmetry using various EP 
mechanisms. First, via spreading activation in symbolic networks (Fazio et al., 1986), 
density indicates stronger connections between positive than between negative 
concepts. In parallel distributed models (Masson, 1995), higher density indicates 
stronger overlap between positive patterns compared to negative patterns. Second, 
via response conflict (Klinger et al., 2000), a core valence pattern might exist which 
can be the basis of the evaluative categorization. Whereas positive valence consists 
of a single core pattern, negative valence might have different patterns, for example, 
one that codes disgust and one that codes anger and so forth. Thus, within 
congruent negative trials, no response facilitation might arise between pain and 
disgust, although both are negative.  
Irrespective of the theoretical model to explain valence asymmetries 
(spreading activation or response competition), if similarity mediates EP effects, then 
the results support differential similarity of positive and negative information for a 
huge range of stimuli, implying that positive information is on average more often 
similar to other positive information than negative information is similar to other 
negative information (Unkelbach et al., 2008). 
Second, the observed asymmetry could be due to an affective matching 
process (Klauer & Stern, 1992). The authors argued that prime and target are 
checked for consistency. When prime and target are congruent this leads to a 
positive outcome of this check (e.g., baby and kitten fit), which leads to a feeling of 
plausibility. A positive result of the consistency/ plausibility check leads to an 
affirmative response (i.e., positive). This process was proposed in addition to a 
spreading activation process, but is also compatible with response competition. Thus, 
a positive prime positive target pair induces response facilitation via spreading 
activation or response competition and additional facilitation of the response “good” 
34 
 
or “positive” based on a feeling of plausibility. In contrast, negative prime negative 
target pairs imply facilitation via spreading activation or response competition, again 
the plausibility check leads to an affirmative (i.e., positive) response that is now 
conflicting and thus needs to be inhibited. The plausibility feeling can be 
conceptualized as a fluency phenomenon (Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013) that goes 
along with a positive notion, which is conflicting with the “negative” response required 
by negative congruent word pairs like pain and disgust.  
The third explanation assumes general inhibition of processing of negative 
stimuli (e.g., Suslow, Ohrmann, & Arolt, 2001) or stronger distraction by negative 
stimuli (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rothermund, Gast, & Wentura, 2011) combined with 
facilitated processing of congruent trials. These assumptions can also be 
implemented in different models, for instance in spreading activation accounts. In 
other words, negative stimuli are either suppressed (e.g., “perceptual defence”; 
McGinnies, 1949) or receive deeper processing before the ongoing task is proceeded 
(Baumeister et al., 2001; Rothermund et al., 2011). These assumptions explain the 
data as follows: Positive congruent trials (P+T+) are facilitated because of their 
congruency and the absence of negative information. Incongruent trials (P+T-  
& P-T+) are inhibited because they are not congruent and they both contain one 
negative concept, which slows down responses. Congruent negative trials (P-T-) are 
facilitated because they are congruent and inhibited because they contain two 
negative concepts. They are equally fast as incongruent trials if the inhibition by a 
second negative concept is approximately as strong as the facilitation by congruency.  
The fact that negative prime positive target trials (P-T+) are faster than positive 
prime negative target trials (P+T-) is in line with inhibition of responses toward task-
relevant target stimuli. The prime valence effect does not strongly impact on the 
results. This contradicts the assumption that negative task-irrelevant distractors (i.e., 
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primes) inhibit processing of following information more strongly than positive 
distractors. Slower responding can both be caused by deeper processing of a 
negative stimulus or inhibition of processing of the negative stimulus. Support for 
favorable processing of negative stimuli in EP comes from neuroimaging data. Ito 
and Cacioppo (2000) showed more intense processing of negative stimuli in EP in 
event-related potential data, which contradicts an explanation in terms of inhibition. 
However, the unstandardized analysis using P1 showed faster responding to 
negative targets than to positive targets in 20 out of 121 effects. Similarly, P2 
indicated faster responding to negative primes than to positive primes in 43 out of 
121 effects. This reversal of results can most parsimoniously be explained by a 
similarity/ density approach (Unkelbach et al., 2008), which claims that positive 
information is not always processed faster than negative information but only when it 
is more similar. Following this argumentation, results with reversed patterns occur 
when the stimulus set is more similar for negative prime-target pairs in contrast to 
positive. Thus, the similarity/ density account offers a consistent and overarching 
approach to valence asymmetries in EP effects. 
In conclusion, EP effects show clear evidence of a valence asymmetry. 
Positive prime-target pairs create stronger EP effects than negative prime-target 
pairs. This effect is in line with the two assumptions that positive information is more 
similar to each other than negative information and that similar prime-target pairs 
create stronger EP effects. However, multiple other processes can explain this 
asymmetry, especially affective matching and a general suppression of or distraction 
by negative information. This weakens the ability of this finding to argue in favor of an 
impact of similarity in EP. To overcome this limitation the following experiments 
manipulate similarity directly. The first experiment manipulates similarity within the 
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positive and negative valence to investigate whether the effect of valence is mediated 
by similarity. 
 
Experimental Evidence on Effects of Similarity in Evaluative Priming 
The meta-analysis offered first evidence that EP effects are influenced by 
similarity. However, the evidence requires the assumption that positive information is 
on average more similar than negative information. Alternative explanations can 
account for the results, especially a general suppression of negative information 
(McGinnies, 1949), a stronger ability of negative information to divert attention away 
from the main task (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rothermund et al., 2011), and affective 
matching. To test whether the valence asymmetry found is based on similarity or is a 
general effect of valence further evidence is needed. To provide this evidence I 
conducted a series of four experiments that manipulated prime-target similarity 
orthogonally to valence. The first experiment tests for similarity effects by 
manipulating similarity via item selection. The following three experiments 
(Experiment 2 - 4) induce prime-target similarity by repeated presentation of a 
specific stimulus, assuming that identical stimuli are highly similar. Thus, the four 
experiments test for similarity effects using two different operationalizations of 
similarity. Experiment 3 and 4 rule out alternative explanations for Experiment 2. 
 
Similarity by Item Selection 
The first test of similarity effects uses item selection to create high and low 
similarity prime-target. If similarity impacts on EP than EP effects should be stronger 
for highly similar prime-target pairs compared to less similar prime-target pairs. 
Further, if similarity underlies the valence asymmetries found in the meta-analysis, 
highly similar prime-target pairs should elicit EP effects irrespective of valence. 
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Experiment 1. The following study compared two conditions by varying prime-
target stimuli: One condition replicates the assumed natural condition where positive 
stimuli are similar and negative stimuli are dissimilar. This condition is compared to a 
second condition where positive stimuli are dissimilar and negative stimuli are similar. 
I manipulated similarity by selecting prime-target stimuli based on graphical 
inspection of a plotted solution from multidimensional scaling. This solution was 
based on similarity ratings from a pilot test (Unkelbach et al., 2008). Thus, 
participants categorized similar and dissimilar prime-target pairs in an EP paradigm. 
Following this, each participant rated similarity of all prime-target pairs. These ratings 
were used both as a manipulation check and to predict response latencies in the EP 
task based on similarity. 
 
Method. 
Participants. Fifty-eight University of Heidelberg students (46 female, 9 male) 
participated either for 3 € or course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the two similarity conditions (positive similar vs. positive dissimilar). Fifty 
participants were native speakers of German, 4 reported that German was their first 
foreign language, 1 reported that German was his or her second foreign language.1  
Stimuli. I chose eight positive and eight negative words for the two similarity 
conditions (see appendix). Thus, the experiment used four word sets with similar 
positive, dissimilar positive, similar negative and dissimilar negative words. The 
selection was based on MDS data by Unkelbach et al. (2008). They collected 
similarity ratings of 40 words. All stimuli were nouns with strong valence (Klauer & 
Musch, 1999). From these stimuli primes and targets were chosen to be either very 
                                                 
1
 Excluding non-native speakers did not affect results. 
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close (i.e., similar) or very distant (i.e., dissimilar) to each other based on visual 
inspection. Each word was either used as prime or as target. In both conditions 
positive nouns (positive similar: M = 3.71, SD= 0.64, positive dissimilar: M = 3.40, 
SD = 0.52) were rated clearly more positive than negative nouns (positive similar: M 
= -3.48, SD = 0.58, positive dissimilar: M = -3.80, SD = 0.39) on a scale from -5 to 
+5; (Klauer & Musch, 1999). This difference in valence was significant (positive 
similar: t(14) = 23.58, p < .001, positive dissimilar: t(14) = 31.42, p < .001). However, 
positive and negative words did not differ regarding extremity (positive similar: t(14) = 
0.78, p = .449, positive dissimilar: t(14) = -1.75, p = .103). 
 
Procedure. After arriving at the lab, participants read and signed an informed 
consent explaining that they would participate in a study about word evaluation. 
Then, the experimenter seated participants at individual computers. A VisualBasic 
program controlled the stimulus presentation and recorded responses and latencies; 
latencies were assessed using a high frequency timer. The experimenter started the 
program which provided all instructions. The program informed participants that two 
words would be presented shortly after each other and that they should categorize 
only the second word as positive or negative by pressing one of two keys on the 
keyboard. Key assignment was counterbalanced. Participants should respond as 
quickly and accurately to the second word as possible. The priming task started with 
4 practice trials including words that were not used in the experimental trials (guns, 
sun, death, and baby). Following practice trials experimental trials started. All primes 
were paired with all targets, resulting in 64 pairs and each pair was presented twice, 
resulting in 128 trials. Each participant received a new randomized presentation 
order, with the restriction that each pair was presented once before repeating a pair. 
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross in the center of the screen 
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for 700 ms, followed by the presentation of the prime for 200 ms. A blank screen 
followed for 150 ms, until the onset of the target, resulting in a SOA of 350 ms. The 
target stayed on screen until the participant responded. The next trial started with a 
delay of 1500 ms (inter trial interval). All words were presented in black on a grey 
background. After completing the EP task the similarity ratings for the MDS started. 
The similarity ratings included all words form the EP task and included all 
combinations of word pairs. Each word was paired with each word irrespective 
whether it was a prime or a target, unlike in the priming procedure. This resulted in 
120 comparisons. Each comparison consisted of two words, one on the left and one 
on the right side of the screen. The left/right positions of words were determined 
randomly. Similarity was rated on a scale ranging from 1 (very similar) to 9 (very 
dissimilar). Participants had no further instruction what feature of similarity they 
should use. After the completion of the MDS participants were thoroughly debriefed 
and thanked. An experimental session lasted approximately 30 min.  
 
Results. 
Response latencies. Results compared mean response latencies for positive 
similar and negative dissimilar with positive dissimilar and negative similar trials. I 
eliminated response latencies of false decisions, as well as all response latencies 
under 250 ms. Latencies slower than 1000 ms were equated to 1000 ms. Data from 
three participants was excluded: Two produced standard deviation that were marked 
as outliers by deviating more than 3 SD from mean. One showed responses at 
change level. Excluding participants had no effect on the results. The data was 
analysed using a 2 (similarity: positive similar and negative dissimilar vs. positive 
dissimilar and negative similar) x 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (congruency: 
congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA, with similarity as only between-subject factor. All 
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means are shown in Figure 3. Visual inspection supports the predictions. The 
positive similar negative dissimilar condition replicated the results of the meta-
analysis: Congruent positive trials showed an average EP effect of 23 ms (relative to 
P+T-). Congruent negative trials again showed a reversed EP effect of -9 ms (when 
compared to P-T+). Thus, the assumed natural similarity condition replicated the 
existing results. However, the critical test is whether results change when similarity 
reverses. Indeed, in the positive dissimilar, negative similar condition positive 
congruent trials showed a markedly smaller EP effect of 6 ms (relative to P+T-). In 
contrast, negative congruent trials showed an EP effect of 17 ms (relative to P-T+). 
This reversal of results was illustrated by a significant three-way interaction of 
congruency by similarity by valence (F(1, 53) = 4.67, p = .035, eta² = .08). Separate 
ANOVAS per similarity condition informed about the nature of this 3-way interaction. 
The interaction was marked by a stronger congruency effect for positive primes 
compared to negative primes in the positive similar condition (valence x congruency: 
F(1, 26) = 4.96, p = .035, eta² = .16). In the positive dissimilar condition no interaction 
of valence and congruency occurred (F(1, 27) = 0.67, p = .420). Thus, the 
congruency effect did not differ for positive and negative prime-target pairs.  
Further, the overall EP effect was significant (F(1, 53) = 5.52, p = .023, 
eta² = .09). Participants responded faster in congruent trials than in incongruent trials. 
The size of the EP effect did not interact with the similarity condition (F(1, 53) = 0.31, 
p = .578). The main effect of valence was also not significant (F(1, 53) = 0.81, 
p = .373). No other effect reached significance (F<1). 
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Figure 3. Mean response latencies and standard errors as a function of prime-target 
congruency, prime valence and similarity condition for Experiment 1. 
 
Similarity ratings. The previous analysis compared differences between the 
condition of similar and dissimilar stimuli. The following analyses explore differences 
between specific stimuli within the same condition. For this purposes I calculated 
similarity scores based on the similarity rating. To do so I averaged similarity ratings 
of each word pair across all participants separately for each similarity condition. The 
MDS used an ASCAL scaling procedure (Young & Hamer, 1987) provided by SAS, 
assuming ordinal structure of similarity ratings. A three dimensional solution reached 
a satisfying fit to the data as indicated by a stress of .04 for the positive similar 
condition and a stress of .05 for the positive dissimilar condition. 
 
Manipulation check. The MDS data was used to check whether the similarity 
conditions varied similarity as intended. For this purpose I summed the squared 
distances of each word to each word of the same valence to receive the Euclidean 
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distance per stimulus and per dimension. The square root of these sums was then 
summed across the three dimensions to form an index of density. High density 
implies high spatial distance and therefore low similarity (Unkelbach et al., 2008). 
This density index is used as manipulation check. Two analyse confirmed that 
participants rated stimuli as similar (vs. dissimilar) as predicted. In the positive similar 
condition positive words had a density of 1.68 and were therefore highly similar to 
each other whereas negative words had a density of 8.07 and were thus relatively 
dissimilar to each other. Thus, positive stimuli were more similar than negative stimuli 
(t(14) = 20.57, p < .001). For the positive dissimilar condition results were reversed: 
Negative stimuli had a mean density of 2.99, positive stimuli had a density of 6.36 
(t(14) = -6.41, p < .001). Negative words were more similar than positive words. 
Thus, the similarity manipulation by item selection was successful. 
 
Predicting response latencies by similarity ratings. If similarity impacts EP 
effects then prime-target similarity should also predict responses toward specific 
prime-target pairs. This analysis is more sensitive to the hypothesis that EP is 
affected by similarity as it also includes variations of specific prime-target pairs. To 
predict response latencies from similarity I calculated another index of similarity. This 
index compared prime-target pairs whereas the earlier analysis compared all stimuli 
of the same valence. For this purpose I summed the Euclidian distances of each 
prime to all of its 8 targets (4 congruent and 4 incongruent) on each dimension. This 
index was then correlated with the 16 response latencies associated with each 
prime-target pair. For the positive similar condition the resulting correlation between 
index of similarity and response latencies in the priming procedure was r = .54. For 
the positive dissimilar condition the correlation was r = .48. Accordingly, primes with 
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higher distance to their targets (i.e., dissimilar) are associated with slower responses 
and primes with lower distance are associated with faster responses. 
 
Discussion. The data replicates typical valence asymmetries of EP effects as 
reported in the meta-analysis when positive prime-target pairs are similar and 
negative prime-target pairs are dissimilar. When the similarity of positive and 
negative stimuli is reversed EP effects also reverse. No main effect of valence 
occurred in the data. Further, similarity of prime-target pairs correlated with response 
latencies. Responses were faster for similar prime-target pairs relative to dissimilar 
prime-target pairs. This effect of similarity did not depend on valence. This 
contradicts the assumption of a general inhibition of negative information (McGinnies, 
1949) or stronger distractions by negative information (Taylor, 1991) as well as an 
explanation in terms of a general facilitation of processing of negative information 
(Baumeister et al., 2001). Thus, these findings clearly contradict alternative 
interpretations of the meta-analytic results in terms of a general valence effect. 
Instead, the underlying difference in informational similarity mediated the valence 
asymmetry found before. Similarity predicted EP effects better than valence. 
 
Implication for theories of evaluative priming. The results contradict the 
assumption that valence asymmetries in EP are created solely by a target or prime 
main effect. Further, they do not support an explanation in terms of affective 
matching. This explanation assumes that responses in positive congruent trials are 
facilitated more than negative congruent trials because congruency has a positive 
affective quality (e.g., because it is easy to process) and therefore fosters responses 
in the positive category. Instead the evidence is in line with stronger EP effects for 
similar prime-target pairs in contrast to dissimilar prime-target pairs. Thus, similarity 
44 
 
seems to impact on EP effects. The effects of similarity are in line with spreading 
activation explanations that assume encoding facilitation at target level. Models of 
spreading activation at valence level, where facilitation of the concepts “positive” or 
“negative” drives the EP effect are not supported because they do not imply effects of 
similarity. Further, a compound cue model is in line with the results under the 
assumptions that compound cues form based on similarity. 
The findings challenge response competition accounts as explanations of EP 
effects. Especially, a sole process of response competition is not in line with the 
results. If congruence and incongruence of responses were the only relevant factor 
for EP effects then similarity should not influence effects. However, it is possible that 
a response competition process is involved in EP effects but an additional process 
occurred that created the similarity effects. This assumption is outlined in the 
limitations below. 
 
Limitations. A possible critique regarding this experiment is that similar word 
sets could have more associations than dissimilar word sets. Associations might 
activate additional processes that are distinct from processes activated by non-
associated, semantically similar stimuli (Lucas, 2000). Thus, the faster responses 
towards similar in contrast to dissimilar prime-target pairs could be based on 
additional associative relations. This argument is supported by studies showing that 
priming effect are stronger with than without associations (Lucas, 2000). To test for 
differences in the frequency of associations I measured associative strength between 
primes and targets. A sample of 80 participants was instructed to report 5 
associations they had per word. Each participant had to respond to five or six words 
from the list of 32 words used in this and other priming studies. The resulting 
proportion of associations between each prime and target was low. Eleven percent of 
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associations reported to a given prime were a target. Within the positive similar 
conditions similar (i.e., positive) prime-target pairs showed more associations (7%) 
than dissimilar (i.e., negative) prime-target pairs (0%). This difference was significant 
in one-sided testing (t(30) = 1.83, p = 0.04). In the positive dissimilar condition similar 
(i.e., negative) prime-target pairs are also more often associated (4%) than dissimilar 
(i.e., positive) prime-target pairs (0%). However, a one-sided t-test was not significant 
(t(30) = -1.00, p = 16). Though the amount of associations was low similar primes 
were more often associated with their targets than dissimilar primes. This is in line 
with the aforementioned finding that associations and similarity are empirically often 
confounded (Hutchison, 2003). Thus, associations could have affected the results in 
addition to similarity. To exclude associations as a possible alternative explanation 
for similarity effects the next experiments will manipulate similarity without creating 
associations. 
A similar critique is that the design of Experiment 1 confounds similarity and 
valence per participant. High similarity between prime and target is always a valid 
predictor for either a positive (positive similar condition) or negative (positive 
dissimilar condition) response. Thus, a participant can develop an expectation about 
the role of similarity in the design, namely that similar prime-target pairs correspond 
to a specific (i.e., positive or negative) response. Hence, this experiment might not 
measure standard EP processes but instead introduces an additional process. To 
overcome this limitation the next experiments vary similarity within both positive and 
negative valence simultaneously. Based on this approach similarity is no longer 
predictive for a specific response and cannot be used intentionally by participants. 
Another limitation of the experiment above is that only stimuli with strong 
valence were used. Thus, it is unclear whether the effect of similarity generalizes to 
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less extreme stimuli. To overcome these limitations the next experiments varied 
similarity within the same valence and used new stimuli. 
 
Similarity by repetition 
The following three experiments again varied similarity of prime and target. To 
resolve the confound of similarity with valence I varied similarity within the same 
valence category. Further, to prevent similar prime-target pairs to have more 
associations than dissimilar prime-target pairs I opted for a different manipulation of 
similarity. In the next experiments similar prime-target pairs are formed by repeated 
presentation of a single word as both prime and target. Thus, prime and target are 
identical. The identical prime-target pairs imply complete feature overlap and low 
associations as a stimulus rarely co-occurs with itself. A pilot test (see above) 
confirmed a mean associative strength in identical trials of zero. The pilot test 
requested 5 free associations for 6 nouns each (including overall 32 nouns) from 80 
participants. As a result no word was associated with itself. 
The identical trials are interspersed in a standard EP paradigm with congruent 
(i.e., non-identical), and incongruent trials. For the sake of brevity I will refer to 
congruent non-identical trials as “congruent” and identical congruent trials as 
“identical”. However, identical trials are also congruent. The identical trials are thus 
high in similarity whereas the congruent trials are relatively low in similarity. Hence, 
only a small number of trials are similar and the similar trials are both positive and 
negative for all participants. Thus, similarity is not predictive for a specific response 
and the systematic use of similarity as a response cue is implausible based on the 
low rate of similar prime-target pairs. 
An important aspect of the design is that both congruent trials and identical 
trials require the same response towards prime and target. If identical trials create 
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stronger EP effects this cannot be attributed to responses competition as responses 
in identical trials are the same as responses in congruent trials. Thus, similarity 
effects within these experiments cannot be attributed to response competition. Thus, 
the design allows testing response competition explanations. 
 
Overview. All following three experiments test the hypothesis that identical 
prime-target pairs are categorized faster than congruent trials because identical 
prime-target pairs are more similar than congruent non-identical prime-target pairs. 
Experiment 2 uses moderate stimuli, Experiment 3 and 4 present extreme stimuli. 
Experiment 3 reduces perceptual similarity by means of different fonts. Experiment 4 
eliminates perceptual similarity by using pictures as primes and words as targets. 
 
Experiment 2. Experiment 2 uses a standard EP paradigm with additional 
identical prime-target pairs. To generalise results I varied SOA as a between factor. 
 
Method. 
Participants. Seventy-one subjects participated in return for course credit or 
6€. Participants were mostly students from the University of Heidelberg or recruited 
from the main street. Six participants were excluded because they did not understand 
or comply with the instructions. However, including them did not influence results. 
The remaining participants were randomly assigned to the SOA 50 (33 participants) 
and SOA 350 (32 participants) conditions. Fifty-five participants were native speakers 
of German, 7 reported that German was their first foreign language, 3 reported that 
German was his or her second foreign language. 
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Apparatus and Stimuli. The design was highly similar to Experiment 1. To test 
whether similarity effects would generalize to moderate stimuli the experiment used 
new stimuli. Eight positive and 8 negative nouns from Klauer and Musch (1999) and 
from Schwibbe, Räder, Schwibbe, Borchardt, and Geiken-Pophanken (1994) were 
used as both primes and targets. This differs from Experiment 1 where words were 
either primes or targets. All words were rated to have clear but moderate valence. 
Based on the two word norms positive words showed average ratings of 1.5 and 
negative words of -1.7 (on a scale from +5 to -5). Positive and negative words 
differed significantly in regard to valence (t(14) = 10.77, p < .001) but not in regard to 
extremity (t(14) = -0.59, p > .05). The stimulus list is in the appendix. 
Each word was paired with each other word, each pairing was repeated once 
in interchanging order of prime and target. This resulted in 120 incongruent trials, 120 
congruent non-identical trials and 16 identical trials. Thereby, the proportion of 
congruent trials among all trials departed slightly from 50%, this could increase the 
congruency main effect (Klauer, Rossnagel, & Musch, 1997) and would not interact 
with the predictions. Presentation parameters were identical to Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure. The procedure was largely identical to Experiment 1. In contrast to 
Experiment 1 this experiment included 256 experimental trials. In the SOA 50 (350) 
condition the prime was presented for 33 (200) ms followed by a blank screen for 17 
(150) ms.  
 
Results. Results were based on mean response latencies for correct 
responses in congruent, incongruent and identical trials. Response latencies faster 
than 250 ms were excluded. Latencies slower than 1000 ms were equated to 1000 
ms. An analyses of variance was conducted for the 2 (SOA: 50 vs. 350) x 3 
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(congruency: congruent vs. incongruent vs. identical) x 2 (prime valence: positive vs. 
negative) design (cf. Figure 4). This comparison revealed a strong main effect of 
congruency (F(2, 62) = 23.92, p < .001, eta² = 0.44). Further, prime valence showed 
a tendency of faster responses based on positive primes (628 ms) relative to 
negative primes (636 ms). However, this effect did not reach conventional levels of 
significance (F(1, 63) = 3.39, p = .070, eta² = 0.05). No other effect was significant 
(F < 2).  
Two additional analyses investigated the congruency effect in more detail. 
They compared congruent with incongruent trials (i.e., the standard EP effect) and 
congruent with identical trials. Both analyses of variance included SOA and prime 
valence. The first analysis showed that the standard priming effect (i.e., congruent 
vs. incongruent trials) was significant (F(1, 63) = 24.09, p < .001, eta² = 0.28); 
responses in congruent trials were 13 ms faster than in incongruent trials. However, 
the second analysis reveals that responses in identical trials were even faster; 
identical trials were 27 ms faster than congruent trials (F(1, 63) = 14.77, p < .001, 
eta² = 0.19). 
Descriptively, the standard EP effect was stronger for positive prime-target 
pairs compared to negative prime-target pairs. Congruent trials with positive primes 
were 25 ms faster than incongruent trials with positive primes. In contrast, congruent 
trials with negative primes were only 2 ms faster than incongruent trials. However, 
this interaction did not reach conventional levels of significance (F(1, 63) = 5.43, 
p =. 06, eta²=0.05)2. No valence asymmetry was observed for identical trials 
compared to congruent trials (F(1, 63) = 0.01, p =. 91). 
 
                                                 
2
 After excluding non-native speakers this interaction was significant. 
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Figure 4. Mean response latencies and standard errors as a function of prime-target 
congruency, prime valence and stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) for Experiment 2. 
 
Discussion. Results show that responses in trials with identical prime-target 
pairs are faster than responses in both incongruent and congruent trials. Thus, highly 
similar (i.e., identical) prime-target pairs elicit faster responses than relatively 
dissimilar (i.e., congruent) prime-target pairs. This acceleration cannot be explained 
by response competition, as responses in both identical and congruent trials are the 
same. The finding is in line with a general cognitive process (i.e., spreading 
activation, compound cue) based on similarity, which creates faster responses for 
similar trials. The acceleration of identical trials could be caused by semantic overlap 
of identical primes and targets. The effect in identical trials is not moderated by 
valence. Thus, responses show no valence asymmetry in identical trials. This is in 
line with the assumption that valence asymmetries are mediated by similarity. A 
general inhibition of responses in negative trials should in contrast create less 
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pronounced acceleration in negative identical trials than in positive identical trials. 
Instead, if similarity is constant (e.g., high) no valence asymmetry is evident.  
In this experiment identical trials are rare and were presented in both the 
positive and negative category, therefore fast responses in identical trials cannot be 
attributed to a strategic use of similarity by participants as in Experiment 1. It is not 
possible that participants associated similar prime-target pairs with a specific 
response because identical prime-target pairs required both positive and negative 
responses depending on trial. Further, the data implies that the acceleration of 
responses in similar prime-target pairs occurs without associations between prime 
and target. Additionally, the results support the notion that the effect of similarity 
generalizes to moderate stimuli. 
 
Limitations. The advantage of manipulating similarity by repetitions is that 
associations are less important. However, it introduces a new confound, namely that 
semantic similarity is confounded with perceptual similarity. Similar prime-target pairs 
do not only overlap in their semantic meaning but also in morphologic and perceptual 
aspects. Thus, a plausible alternative interpretation of the results is that not semantic 
similarity but perceptual or morphologic similarity between prime and target facilitated 
target encoding and subsequent responding in identical trials (Peressotti & Grainger, 
1999). Though there are results showing that perceptual similarity does not play an 
important role in priming effects based on stimulus repetition (Feldman & 
Moskovljevic, 1987) we will test this alternative by creating a replication with less 
perceptual overlap. To counter the argument of perceptual similarity Experiment 3 
tested whether identical trials were still faster than congruent trials without high 
perceptual similarity. This experiment introduced a manipulation of perceptual 
similarity either leading to higher or lower perceptual similarity by varying letter case. 
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Experiment 3. In contrast to Experiment 2, this experiment includes a 
condition with low perceptual similarity as well as a condition with high perceptual 
similarity. Again SOA was included as between factor. In contrast to Experiment 2, 
this experiment uses extreme positive and negative stimuli. This ensures that 
evaluative categorization is never ambivalent. Ambiguous categorization of targets 
will prolong response latencies, which might have a stronger effect on means in 
congruent trials than in identical trials because there are only few identical trials (16).  
 
Method. 
Participants. The experimenters recruited seventy-nine participants; mostly 
students from the University of Heidelberg or the main street, who participated in 
return for course credit or 4€. One participant was excluded because he was over 50 
years old. However, inclusion of this participant did not affect levels of significance. 
The remaining participants were randomly assigned to the four conditions resulting 
from the combination of SOA (50 vs. 350) and perceptual similarity (high vs. low). 
Seventy-three participants were native speakers of German, 3 reported that German 
was their first foreign language, 2 reported that German was his or her second 
foreign language. 
 
Stimuli and procedure. This experiment used stimuli with extreme valence 
from Klauer and Musch (1999). Eight positive and 8 negative nouns were used as 
both primes and targets. All words had clear valence. Positive words were 
significantly more positive than negative words (t(14) = 10.77, p < .001) but did not 
differ in extremity (t(14) = -0.59, p > .05). The stimulus list is in the appendix. All other 
aspects of the design were identical to Experiment 2. 
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Perceptual similarity was manipulated by presenting primes and targets in 
default German writing style in the perceptually identical condition (i.e., first letter 
uppercase, other letters lowercase; e.g., “Sommer”) or primes in lowercase letters 
(e.g., “sommer”) and targets in uppercase letters (e.g., “SOMMER”) in the 
perceptually dissimilar condition. 
 
Results. As in the experiments before, response latencies were excluded if 
they belonged to incorrect responses or were faster than 250 ms. Responses slower 
than 1000 ms were equated to 1000 ms. An analysis of variance was conducted with 
a 3 (congruency: incongruent vs. congruent vs. identical) x 2 (SOA: 50 vs. 350) x 2 
(perceptual similarity: identical vs. dissimilar) x 2 (prime valence: positive vs. 
negative) design with SOA and perceptual similarity as between-participant factors. 
Means are depicted in Figure 5. The data shows a strong effect of congruency (F(2, 
73) = 32.21, p < .001, eta² = 0.47). To analyse this effect I conducted separate 
analyses per similarity condition. Responses in congruent trials were on average 24 
ms faster than in incongruent trials (F(1, 74) = 31.32, p < .001, eta² = 0.30). 
Responses in identical trials were 26 ms faster than in congruent trials (F(1, 
74) = 34.03, p < .001, eta² = 0.32). Crucially the difference of congruent and identical 
trials did not significantly interact with perceptual similarity (F(1, 74) = 1.23, p = .27, 
eta² = 0.02). Yet, the difference between identical and congruent trials was reduced 
from 33 ms in the perceptually identical condition to 19 ms in the perceptually 
dissimilar condition. 
The analysis of the complete design showed an interaction between SOA and 
congruency, which was significant (F(2, 73) = 3.67, p = .03, eta² = 0.09). Differences 
were larger under short SOA than under long SOA: Under short SOA (vs. long SOA) 
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congruent trials were 31 ms (vs. 13 ms) faster than incongruent trials and identical 
trials were 36 ms (vs. 16 ms) faster than congruent trials. 
 
Figure 5. Mean response latencies and standard errors as a function of prime-target 
congruency, prime valence and stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) for Experiment 3. 
 
The Interaction of congruency and valence was significant (F(2, 73) = 4.45, 
p = .015, eta² = 0.11). This effect was mainly driven by differences between 
congruent and incongruent trials and not by differences between congruent and 
identical trials. Regarding positive primes congruent trials were 34 ms faster than 
incongruent trials. Regarding negative primes congruent trials were only 13 ms faster 
than incongruent trials. Thus, the standard EP effect was stronger for positive than 
for negative primes (F(1, 74) = 8.78, p = .004, eta² = 0.11). For identical trials this 
valence difference was not significant: Positive identical trials were 57 ms faster than 
positive congruent trials. Negative identical trials were 41 ms faster than negative 
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congruent trials (F(1, 74) = 0.53, p = .47, eta² = 0.00). Further, a valence main effect 
with faster responses in trials of positive primes was significant (F(1, 74) = 4.38, 
p = .04, eta² = 0.06). No other effect reached significance. 
 
Discussion. Again, this data showed faster responses in identical relative to 
congruent trials. This effect was not moderated by perceptual similarity. Yet, in 
tendency the advantage of identical trials became smaller in the perceptually 
dissimilar condition. Thus, there might be an effect of perceptual similarity. The next 
experiment will therefore enhance the perceptual dissimilarity between primes and 
targets. 
Experiment 3 replicated results from the meta-analysis and Experiment 2 
showing that the standard EP effect differed for positive and negative primes. 
However, responses in identical trials were facilitated relative to congruent trials 
irrespective of valence. The use of extreme stimuli did not change the pattern of 
results. 
 
Experiment 4. One objection to Experiment 3 is that the perceptual similarity 
between uppercase and lower case letters is still too high (e.g., “S” vs. “s”). To 
overcome this caveat Experiment 4 replicates Experiment 3 with pictures as primes 
and words as targets thereby eliminating perceptual similarity. If semantic similarity 
and not perceptual similarity is responsible for faster responses in identical trials this 
implies that the activation of the concept itself leads to faster categorisations 
compared to the activation of another concept. 
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Method. 
Stimuli and procedure. All procedural aspects were identical to Experiment 2 
and 3; SOA was varied between-participants. Stimuli were the same strongly 
valenced concepts as in Experiment 3. However, pictures portraying easy to identify 
concepts replaced the prime words. The pictures displayed the same concepts as the 
words. To ensure that scenes would be interpreted in the intended way by all 
participants a learning phase was added. In this phase each picture was presented 
twice with its label. The label was the word that was used as prime in Experiment 3. 
 
Participants. Sixty-one University of Heidelberg students participated for 4€ or 
course credit. One participant was excluded because he was older than 40 years 3. 
Three participants reported that German was their first foreign language, 5 reported 
that German was their second foreign language. 
 
Results. I analysed the 3 (congruency: incongruent vs. congruent vs. 
identical) x 2 (prime valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (SOA: 50 vs. 350) design with 
an analysis of variance, with SOA as the only between-participants factor (see Figure 
6). The results showed a main effect of congruency (F(2, 56) = 20.16, p < .001, eta² = 
0.42). Overall, responses were slower in the SOA 50 condition (vs. 350) resulting in a 
significant main effect of SOA (F(1, 57) = 4.43, p = 0.04, eta² = 0.08). No other effect 
was significant. Separate analyses comparing congruent with incongruent and 
congruent with identical trials supported the predictions. In congruent trials responses 
were 34 ms faster than in incongruent trials (F(1, 57) = 22.88, p < .001, eta² = 0.29). 
                                                 
3
 Exclusion did not affect results. 
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Responses in identical trials were 28 ms faster than in congruent trials 
(F(1, 58) = 19.40, p < .001, eta² = 0.25). 
 
Figure 6. Mean response latencies and standard errors as a function of prime-target 
congruency, prime valence and stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) for Experiment 4. 
 
Discussion. Even without perceptual overlap between prime and target the 
data replicated the finding of faster responses after identical prime-target pairs 
compared to congruent pairs. Thus, perceptual overlap is not necessary to 
accelerate categorizations of targets following identical primes. Instead, the data is in 
line with stronger EP effects for semantically similar prime-target pairs. No valence 
asymmetry was apparent in this study. This could be a chance finding. However, it 
could also be due to a feature of picture stimuli. Pictures are generally more concrete 
than words. Two pictures might not be as similar to each other as two comparatively 
abstract words.  
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General Discussion 
Five studies provided evidence that similarity influences the size of EP effects. 
Higher similarity between prime and target predicted larger EP effects. This was true 
for prime-target pairs selected from MDS, identical prime-target pairs and positive 
prime-target pairs (vs. negative prime-target pairs) that are relatively similar to each 
other according to the density hypothesis (Unkelbach, 2012; Unkelbach et al., 2008). 
While stronger EP effects for positive stimuli can also be attributed to a general 
feature of valence, this is not the case for the effect of identical trials (Experiment 2 to 
4) and preselected similarity (Experiment 1). Furthermore, Experiment 1 supported 
the assumption that the valence asymmetries in the meta-analysis are mediated by 
similarity. The EP effect reversed for positive and negative congruent trials when 
negative prime-target pairs were selected to be similar and positive prime-target pairs 
were selected to be dissimilar. 
Further, Experiments 1 to 4 showed larger EP effects for similar prime-target 
pairs at both short and medium SOA, for extreme and moderate stimuli. These 
findings were replicated by the meta-analysis, which was based on data from multiple 
research groups, multiple designs, and with various stimuli. Thus, there is strong 
evidence for the generality of the impact of similarity on EP effects. The repetition 
priming data (Experiment 2 – Experiment 4) supported the view that similarity is at 
the heart of similarity effects and not associations.  
These findings have important implications for the conceptualization of EP. To 
clarify these implications I will first outline the consequences of the findings on 
processes underlying EP effects. Subsequently, I will elaborate on the implications 
regarding valence asymmetries and evaluative priming as a measure of attitudes. 
Further, I will outline implications for evaluative processes in general. Eventually, I 
will discuss limitations and future directions of this research. 
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Underlying Mechanisms of Evaluative Priming Effects 
The evidence regarding the impact of similarity on EP effects is problematic for 
a response competition explanation of EP effects. Response competition argues that 
EP effects are solely based on congruence and incongruence of responses (Klauer 
et al., 1997). Similarity should not affect EP effects as long as it does not interfere 
with responses. Especially problematic is the repetition priming data where prime and 
target share the same response for both identical (congruent) and (non-identical) 
congruent trials. Still responses in identical trials are faster than in congruent trials. 
There are two ways to interpret this finding: Either, identical trials imply processes in 
addition to response competition, which foster responses in incongruent trials or 
response competition is not an appropriate model to describe EP effects in both 
identical and congruent trials and EP effects are based on other processes. These 
processes can be spreading activation or compound cue mechanisms. The first 
interpretation that repetition priming effects are based on multiple processes is 
difficult to uphold based on the fact that identical trials were interspersed within the 
complete EP design, including congruent and incongruent trials. This practically 
excludes the operation of intentional or strategic processes in these trials as it is not 
possible to predict identical trials. The only possible alternative to explain faster 
processing of identical trials is that they foster the recognition of the target concept 
itself. However, this interpretation is not supported by Experiment 1, which showed 
stronger EP effects for similar prime-target pairs without identical trials and thus 
without faster recognition of the target by stimulus-repetition. In conclusion, assuming 
multiple processes in addition to response competition is possible but not 
parsimonious. 
The second interpretation that both congruent and identical trials are fostered 
by the same mechanism forms a coherent and parsimonious model: The stronger EP 
60 
 
effect for similar prime-target pairs can be integrated into models of spreading 
activation and compound cue. In spreading activation models similar prime-target 
pairs imply stronger relations between concepts (Collins & Loftus, 1975) or stronger 
overlap of patterns (Hutchison, 2003). A priming effect occurs, when the target 
concept is strongly connected to the prime or the overlap between concepts is big 
enough. In both cases the priming effect stems from faster recognition of a target 
after presentation of a similar prime. An implication of this model is that the EP effect 
should not occur for all prime-target pairs of the same valence because not all 
concepts are connected or strongly overlapping. 
As the effect of similarity must be conceptualized on the level of specific 
prime-target pairs, the findings also imply that spreading activation at valence level is 
not an appropriate assumption for EP effects. This model assumes that primes 
activate valence concepts (i.e., positive and negative) and that this activation 
facilitates responses. However, as long as primes are highly connected to the 
valence concept, which must be the case for the highly positive and negative stimuli 
used in Experiments 1, 3, and 4, any prime should create the same activation or 
responses. Prime-target similarity should be irrelevant. Thus, only those spreading 
activation models that locate EP effects at the level of target concepts can implement 
the similarity findings. The same arguments apply to the evaluation window account 
(Klauer et al., 2009). As responses towards the target are only based on evaluative 
information by prime and target effects of prime-target similarity cannot be explained. 
Despite its ability to explain similarity effects in EP, spreading activation was 
facing a variety of challenges (see for example Wentura, 1999). Especially, the 
absence of EP effects in other tasks than the evaluative decision task was seen as 
problematic. EP effects were repeatedly absent with the pronunciation task (Klauer & 
Musch, 2001; but see also Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002; Spruyt, 
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Hermans, Pandelaere, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004) or semantic categorization task, 
which requires participants to classify for instance the animacy of targets (De Houwer 
et al., 2002; Spruyt, De Houwer, & Hermans, 2009). These findings are problematic if 
it is assumed that target activation activates all aspects of a concept (e.g., De 
Houwer et al., 2002). If for instance, the target concept kitten is activated; its 
evaluation should be faster as well as its pronunciation or its categorization as living 
or non-living. However, evidence is cumulating that this is not the case (Klauer & 
Musch, 2002; Klinger et al., 2000; Rothermund & Wentura, 1998). Instead, EP effects 
seem to depend on feature-specific attention allocation (Spruyt, De Houwer, 
Everaert, & Hermans, 2012; Spruyt et al., 2009). This means that EP effects occur 
solely on the dimension that is attended. If the valence dimension is attended due to 
a response task that requires evaluative decisions EP effects will occur. If a non-
evaluative (e.g., semantic dimension) is attended (e.g., animacy), no EP effect will 
result (Burghardt & Unkelbach, submitted). Based on these findings a further 
adjustment of spreading activation accounts is necessary. When participants attend 
to the valence of a given concept such as kitten, the concept must be represented 
differently than when participants attend to the semantic category of the concept 
kitten. This requires that EP effects must be located in working memory (Fiedler, 
Bluemke, & Unkelbach, 2011) where flexible, goal-dependent processes are 
possible. If EP effects are created in working-memory, the absence of EP effects 
without attention to the valence dimension is no longer problematic (see Schmitz & 
Wentura, 2012). 
A theory that reconciles the available data is a compound cue explanation of 
EP effects (Fockenberg et al., 2006; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988). Based on this account 
priming effects result from facilitated processing of prime-target pairs that form good 
compound cues (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988). To explain the existing data it must be 
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assumed that compound cues form based on similarity. Until now, similarity was not 
assumed to be relevant for the formation of compound cues (Fockenberg et al., 
2006; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988). However, McKoon and Ratcliff (1992) showed that 
compound cues form based on associative strength. As associative strength and 
similarity are often confounded (Hutchison, 2003) their findings could also be 
explained by similarity. If similarity influences the formation of compound cues than 
highly similar prime target pairs form good compound cues. Good compounds cues 
generate intense echoes from memory (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988) that facilitate 
categorization. Thus, similar prime target pairs show stronger EP effects. 
An interesting aspect of this account is that compound cue models locate 
priming effect in working memory (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988). Therefore, the absence 
of EP effects when valence is not attended is in line with the predictions. Focusing on 
other aspects than the valence dimension will hinder the formation of a compound 
cue. For instance, in an evaluative decision task the concepts baby and kitten can 
form a good compound because they imply the same positive valence. However, in a 
semantic categorization with the categories “human” and “animal” they do not form a 
compound. 
However, a caveat to compound cue accounts is that they were introduced to 
explain priming effects in the lexical decision task (categorize targets as word or non-
word; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988). Good compounds trigger strong responses from 
memory and thus lead to a feeling of familiarity. This feeling is consistent with a 
“word”-decision. This connection is plausible because non-words are never familiar 
as they are newly invented. In contrast, words can be familiar. A highly familiar 
compound cue thus facilitates responses in a lexical decision task. However, in a 
recent meta-analysis EP effects were not reliable for the lexical decision task 
(Burghardt & Unkelbach, submitted). 
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In conclusion, EP models of spreading activation at the target level as well as 
compound cue models are supported by the findings of this thesis. However, both 
are unable to explain all existing findings. Models purely based on response 
competition and spreading activation at concept level are not in line with my data. 
However, if the EP effect is caused by multiple processes the existence of an 
additional process of response competition or spreading activation at concept level 
remains possible. Thus, the findings add to our understanding of EP processes. Yet, 
they do not provide definite answers regarding the underlying processes.  
 
Implication for Semantic Priming 
If EP effects are based on spreading activation or compound cue accounts, 
this challenges the implications drawn from a response competition account: One of 
these implications relates to the question whether EP effects are caused by the same 
processes as semantic priming effects. Semantic priming is a sequential priming task 
similar to EP. In contrast to EP, congruent primes and targets have a specific 
semantic relation, for instance belong to the same category (e.g., leg and arm) or are 
associates (e.g., chair and table; McNamara, 2005; Neely, 1977). Thus, the two 
paradigms differ in the relation between congruent primes and targets. However, the 
two paradigms also differ in the response task most commonly used. Evaluative 
priming uses mainly the evaluative decision task (Burghardt & Unkelbach, submitted) 
whereas semantic priming uses mainly the lexical decision task (McNamara, 2005). 
The evaluative decision task confounds the response categories with the congruency 
categories. The lexical decision task does not imply this confound. Congruent (e.g., 
chair and table) and incongruent (e.g., chair and lion) trials both require a “word” 
response. Based on this observation, response competition accounts argue that EP 
and semantic priming are not based on the same processes (Klauer et al., 1997; 
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Klinger et al., 2000; Rothermund & Wentura, 1998). In contrast, an explanation of EP 
effects in terms of spreading activation or compound cue implies that semantic 
priming and EP are based on the same processes because these are also the major 
accounts to explain semantic priming effects (McNamara, 2005). This implies that 
findings within the EP paradigm can be transferred to semantic priming research. For 
instance semantic priming effects should be as goal-dependent as EP effects 
(Burghardt & Unkelbach, submitted). 
 
Valence Asymmetries in Evaluative Priming Effects  
The data confirmed the existence of valence asymmetries in EP, showing 
stronger EP effects for trials with positive-positive in contrast to negative-negative 
prime-target pairs relative to their respective incongruent trials. In line with the 
density hypothesis (Unkelbach et al., 2008) I argued that these valence asymmetries 
are based on differential similarity of positive and negative information. This 
assumption was supported by Experiment 1: Valence asymmetries disappeared 
when similarity was manipulated. The EP effect was stronger for similar compared to 
dissimilar prime-target pairs irrespective of valence. Further, no valence asymmetry 
occurred for identical trials. This contradicts an alternative explanation in terms of 
general processing differences between positive and negative trials. When similarity 
was constant no valence asymmetry occurred. 
In reverse, under the assumption that similarity impacts on EP effects, the 
data supports the higher similarity of positive in contrast to negative information. The 
data of the meta-analysis, which is based on a wide variety of stimuli (including 
words, faces, pictures, sounds, prosody, odor, and flavor), confirms that positive 
stimuli are more often similar to each other than negative stimuli.  
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The findings imply a more complex conceptualization of valence. In traditional 
conceptualizations of valence, valence is seen as a single dimension with one pole 
for positive and another pole for negative information (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). 
In contrast, the data supports the notion of one/ few positive representations and 
multiple/ more negative representations. Thus, if lower similarity of negative 
information creates the negativity bias in EP effects, this supports the diversity of 
representations of negative information. In contrast, positive information has a 
relatively unspecified representation.  
The reported valence asymmetry in EP effects is based on the informational 
value of negative information. Peeters and Czapinski (1990) term this an information-
processing explanation of valence asymmetries. They argue that the informational 
value of negative information underlies many valence asymmetries for instance the 
higher effectiveness of learning by negative in contrast to positive feedback or the 
more specific description of target persons with negative in contrast to positive traits. 
Thus, the findings fit into the broader research on differences in valence processing.  
 
Implications for Evaluative Priming as an Attitude Measure 
Using EP as a measure, especially to assess attitudes, requires knowing the 
direction of the EP effect. The interpretation of the measure is based on the 
assumption that responses in congruent trials are faster or less error-prone than 
responses in incongruent trials (see Wittenbrink, 2007). If for any reason, the EP 
effect reverses and responses in incongruent trials become faster/ less error-prone 
than responses in congruent trials, then the interpretation of the EP measure will be 
invalid. There is evidence that reversed EP effects occur for extreme primes (Glaser 
& Banaji, 1999) and at very long SOA (Klauer et al., 2009). The data provides further 
evidence that EP effects can disappear or reverse for dissimilar prime-target pairs, 
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especially when they are negative. According to these findings primes and targets 
should be chosen based on their similarity. Hence, if for instance a stereotype 
against black people is measured the target should be similar to the stereotype 
towards black people (i.e., the prime). No EP effect should occur for targets that are 
dissimilar to the prime (black person) for instance a target like taxes. To find similar 
prime-target pairs a pre-test using MDS is possible.  
Further, negative primes are overall less likely to produce reliable EP effects 
as became apparent in the meta-analysis. This is based on their overall dissimilarity. 
Thus, the selection is especially important for negative stimuli. Further, a promising 
approach is to calculate positive and negative EP effects separately (i.e., based on 
positive or negative congruent trials). This will allow conclusions about the question 
which of these effects has higher predictive validity. Subsequent research should 
study predictions of attitudes and behaviors separately for negative and positive EP 
effects, which has not been done until now (Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 
2012; Wittenbrink, 2007).  
 
Implications for Evaluative Processes 
The findings regarding the impact of similarity on EP effects have important 
implications for the conceptualization of everyday evaluations. Traditional 
conceptualization of EP by spreading activation implied general, unconditional EP 
effects (Bargh et al., 1992; Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Hermans et 
al., 1994): The mere encounter with an attitude object, leads to the activation of that 
concept, which leads to the activation of all other concepts of the same valence 
category. Practically, this implies that when people encounter positive or negative 
attitude objects their evaluation affects evaluations of all other attitude objects 
surrounding them. Instead, I argued and tested the hypothesis that evaluations of 
67 
 
one attitude object affect evaluations of other attitude objects only when both are 
similar. 
Apart from this, the task to evaluate the target in EP ensures a specific 
representation of a given concept that does not result without a goal to evaluate (see 
Burghardt & Unkelbach, submitted). Thus, attitude objects will be evaluated when a 
goal to evaluate is active. Furthermore, an evaluation will solely affect evaluations of 
similar attitude objects.  
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The implications outlined above support the relevance of the findings for the 
understanding of the cognitive system, evaluative processes, and the development of 
EP as a measure. However, the findings are subjected to some limitations that 
require further investigations. These limitations are outlined in the following. 
Subsequently, future directions of research will be addressed.  
One of the possible critiques to the presented studies is the operationalization 
of similarity. The similarity manipulation in Experiment 1 was based on the spatial 
approach of similarity, which was criticized because it only captures differences but 
not commonalities of concepts (Markman & Gentner, 2005). Thus, a more refined 
measure of similarity could prove superior for future research. However, it would 
introduce the need to specify dimensions on which specific prime-target pairs are 
compared.  
I argued that identical prime-target pairs are not associated based on the 
operational definition of associative strength. In a free association task participants 
did not repeat a word when asked for an association of it. However, participants 
might assume that they should not repeat a word when asked for associates implying 
that identical trials can be associated. Thus, identical prime-target pairs might be 
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seen as associated in spite of the test of associative strength not indicating 
associations. Therefore, further studies are needed to rule out an effect of 
associations in the data of Experiment 1 to 4. 
The presented experimental research solely used the evaluative decision task 
to study effects of similarity on EP. However, a recent meta-analysis of EP also found 
reliable EP effects for pronunciation responses with picture primes (Burghardt & 
Unkelbach, submitted). The ongoing debate whether EP in the naming task is based 
on the same (De Houwer & Randell, 2004; Pecchinenda, Ganteaume, & Banse, 
2006; Spruyt et al., 2009) or different (Klauer & Musch, 2001) processes as EP with 
the evaluative decision task could be informed by findings regarding the impact of 
similarity on responses in the pronunciation task. Thus, future research could study 
the impact of similarity on EP in the naming task. Another interesting question is 
whether EP effects can be reliable in the lexical decision task. In the recent meta-
analysis of EP (Burghardt & Unkelbach, in prep) EP effects were not reliable with the 
lexical decision task. However, this might have been caused by low similarity of 
prime-target pairs studied. EP effects could occur in this task if prime-target similarity 
was high. This is especially important for the question whether semantic priming and 
EP are based on compound cue processes. As compound cue models predict 
priming effects for the lexical decision task, probing the existence of EP effects with 
the lexical decision task is a critical test for this account.  
The data supported the existence of stronger EP effects for positive congruent 
trials in contrast to negative congruent trials. However, the implications for EP as an 
attitude measure are ambiguous. Though positive congruent pairs provide stronger 
effects this does not imply that positive trials have a stronger predictive value. 
Testing for differences in predictive value is needed.  
69 
 
In sum, the findings reinforce the importance of similarity as a basic principle 
that underlies cognitive processes. The data argues against blatant effects of 
evaluation; rather the evaluative system uses refined mechanisms that govern 
processing and responding. It will be the task of future research to uncover these 
mechanisms. 
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Appendix 
Primes and Targets used in Experiment 1 to 4 (German translations in parentheses). 
Positive  Negative 
Primes Targets  Primes Targets  
Experiment 1  
positive similar negative dissimilar 
birthday (Geburtstag) gift (Geschenk) cancer (Krebs) taxes (Steuer) 
sunshine (Sonnenschein) music (Musik) alcoholism (Alkoholismus) recession (Rezession) 
cake (Kuchen) flowers (Blumen) toothache (Zahnschmerz) cockroach (Kakerlake) 
summer (Sommer) friend (Freund) virus (Virus) bombs (Bomben) 
positive dissimilar negative similar 
kitten (Kätzchen) pizza (Pizza) bombs (Bomben) war (Krieg) 
gift (Geschenk) Hawaii (Hawaii) death (Tod) hate (Hass) 
strawberry (Erdbeere) holiday (Urlaub) disease (Krankheit) crime (Verbrechen) 
music (Musik) movies (Kino) hell (Hölle) guns (Gewehre) 
 
 
Positive Primes and Targets Negative Primes and Targets 
Experiment 2  
  
salary (Gehalt) right (Recht) blemish (Makel) radiation (Strahlung) 
armchair (Sessel) eagle (Adler) chasm (Kluft) hornet (Hornisse) 
cat (Katze) swimming (Schwimmen) rat (Ratte) smoking (Rauchen) 
benefit (Nutzen) snow (Schnee) error (Irrtum) hardness (Härte) 
Experiment 3 - 4    
summer (Sommer) gift (Geschenk) divorce (Scheidung) virus (Virus) 
ice cream (Eiscreme) music (Musik) litter (Abfall) cancer (Krebs) 
friend (Freund) hawaii (Hawaii) war (Krieg) hell (Hölle) 
movies (Kino) kitten (Kätzchen) taxes (Steuern) hate (Hass) 
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